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INTRODUCTION

In April 2009, after baptism, confirmation, and twenty years as a Missouri Synod
Lutheran, I entered the Roman Catholic Church. My reasons for doing so were manifold,
but included an attraction to a sense of community in the Mass and the various mysteries
of sacramentality, among other things. The fact is, in part, that Regis University and its
Catholics sold me on Catholicism; they asked me how I might live and think better, and
when they showed me how, their example was often Catholic. I also met Catholics
outside of Regis, like my grandparents, various individuals at St. Mary’s High School in
Colorado Springs, CO, my alma mater, and Colorado Attorney General John Suthers,
whom I discuss at length in this project, who opened my eyes to Catholic theology and
the raw power of Church teaching, starting me on a road of direction and prayer that
ended in a second confirmation of my Christian identity.
During my time at Regis, I have also spent a significant amount of time
researching legal questions and interning in legal settings. My career interests include
public service of the legal variety, potentially as a criminal prosecutor. An interest in the
law has led me, on various occasions, to the questions and controversy which surround
the United States’ practice of the death penalty. Though I have attended various talks and
lectures on the subject, worked with attorneys who prosecute or defend capital cases, and
visited Colorado’s highest prison facility, my personal experiences with capital
punishment have been very limited. These limited experiences did, however, spark an
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interest in further exploring the topic of capital punishment and contemplating some of
the most difficult moral questions it raises that American society faces today.
As a new Catholic, I thought that my exploration and contemplation might be
focused best through the lens of Church teaching, both for the purpose of limiting the
scope of the project and ensuring relevance personally. What follows here, therefore, is a
novice Catholic and aspiring attorney’s study of the Church’s teaching on capital
punishment and the manner in which the teaching is applied today in the United States.
The first half (Chapters 1-3) surveys some of the most important contributions to the
Church’s teaching on the death penalty through time, including select writings of St.
Augustine of Hippo and Thomas Aquinas, Scriptural and Traditional resources on the
subject, the Consistent Ethic of Life movement’s statement against the death penalty, and
Pope John Paul II’s contribution to the discussion in Evangelium Vitae. The survey
engages various areas of inquiry, but is in no way comprehensive, and leaves ample room
for future research and expansion. It asks, what, exactly, is the Church’s position on
capital punishment, and how has it evolved through time? Has the evolution been
consistent through time? How and from where can Catholics understand the teaching?
How should they understand it? Is it possible to interpret the teaching in various ways?
The second half (Chapters 4-6) analyzes the contemporary approaches of
Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia, Suthers, and death penalty abolitionist Sr. Helen
Prejean as Catholics to issues and situations of capital significance in the United States,
raising various additional questions. How are Catholics involved in America’s use of the
death penalty, and how do they inform their moral approach to capital punishment?
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Again, how should Catholics reconcile various and competing ideologies and
responsibilities surrounding the practice of the death penalty, whether faith-based, dutybound, or otherwise? In light of Catholic teaching, should the United States use the death
penalty, does it need capital punishment, and how should Catholics act given the system
as it is? These questions are complicated and difficult, and I do my best to answer them,
if only in part, while leaving much to be explored.
In Suthers’ No Higher Calling, No Greater Responsibility: A Prosecutor Makes
His Case, a tremendous work which I discuss thoroughly in Chapter 5, he mentions a
paper he wrote in college entitled “The Death Penalty: Cruel and Unusual or Just
Unusual” in which he offered his overall support for the death penalty. 1 “I had no realworld experience with capital punishment at the time and no strong feelings about it,”
Suthers explains regarding the paper, suggesting that his eventual real-world experiences
with the death penalty as a prosecutor truly shaped his conscience regarding capital
punishment, and that he had no personal conviction on the subject until living with it.2
While my conscience may be slightly better informed about the death penalty as a college
undergraduate and my convictions on the subject a bit stronger than Suthers’s were
during his time as an undergraduate at Notre Dame, I echo his sentiment before
beginning. Again, I am little more than a novice Catholic and aspiring attorney, and I
have much to live and see before I can make any statement of finality on what I know and
believe about capital punishment. I am in no way an expert in the discussion to come. I

1

John Suthers, No Higher Calling, No Greater Responsibility: A Prosecutor Makes His Case (Golden, CO:
Fulcrum Publishing, 2008), 56.
2
Ibid.
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am, however, brave and curious, qualities necessary in asking the difficult questions this
project raises, and qualities readers may find helpful in moving forward. This project was
not easy, nor is the subject of capital punishment. Human life and the pursuit of the best
means of defending and preserving human life, however, are well worth the effort.

4

I
Quid Pro Quo and Casting the First Stone:
Augustine and Aquinas on the Death Penalty

In the Gospel of John, Chapter 8, scribes and Pharisees bring to Jesus a woman
caught in the act of adultery. Disrupting his teaching in the temple at the Mount of
Olives, they set the woman in the center of their court, asking Jesus to put aside his
ministry and assume the role of judge. John’s account of the incident suggests that those
who brought the woman forth did so to test Jesus, to see how he might respond to a
heinous wrong in Hebrew society. “‘Now in the law, Moses commanded us to stone such
women,’” they told Jesus. “So what do you say?”3 Without hesitation, Jesus stooped
down to write on the ground with his finger, crouching down beside the alleged
adulteress at her position in the center of the court, seemingly disinterested in their
challenge. “‘Let the one among you who is without sin be the first to throw a stone at
her,’” he said finally to the Church leaders anxiously awaiting his statement of
judgment.4 As the leaders slowly left the Church, one by one, no stones thrown, the
court’s silence and vacancy aptly indicated no one would meet Jesus’s standard for
authoring judgment. “Woman, where are they? Did no one condemn you?” Jesus then
asked the woman, now alone with her in the court. “I do not condemn you either,” he

3

United States Conference of Catholic Bishops, New American Bible, John 8:5,
http://www.usccb.org/nab/bible/john/john8.htm.
4
Ibid., John 8:7.
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resolved. “Go. From now on, sin no more.”5 The woman rose, left, and Jesus remained,
continuing to pray and write indistinguishably with his finger in the ground. Readers can
easily distinguish, however, his answer of forgiveness over condemnation as a definitive
statement of the Gospels on true justice. Faced with death, life endured for the adulteress,
because no one could justify taking it away – not even Christ himself.
The story of this incident, and Jesus’ statements in it, have endured as well, a
consistent point for reflection by many contemplating the morality of capital punishment.
St. Augustine of Hippo, in his 5th century commentary on the Gospel of John, engages
this story directly in the context of judicial authority. “This is Justice speaking: the sinful
woman should be punished, but not by sinners,” Augustine differentiates, Justice being
Christ himself. “This Law should be fulfilled, but not by those who violate the Law. This
is certainly Justice speaking: and others were hit by justice as if it were a wooden club.”6
Justice’s wooden club came in the form of a finger scrawling something in the ground,
but its unconventional form carried the same effect, calling to mind the ignored sin of
those so intent on identifying it in the woman at the center of the court. Augustine
advances this premise – that those without sin can judge the wrongdoing of others, and
not otherwise – through much of his writing. “First, for your own sake, act as judge on
yourself,” Augustine writes in his Sermon on Psalm 2:10.7 “Judge yourself first, then
you’ll be able to leave the inner cell of your conscience in security and go out to someone
else.”8 Stipulated in the requirement to assume a position of judgment is clarity of
5

Ibid., John 8:10-11.
St. Augustine of Hippo, Political Writings (New York, Cambridge University Press, 2001), 105.
7
“And now, kings, give heed; take warning, rulers on earth.” – NAB, Psalm 2:10
8
Augustine, Political Writings, 124.
6

6

conscience, a quality the scribes and Pharisees lacked and Jesus possessed, but did not
want to lose by ending the adulteress’s life. For the purposes of judgment, however, selfreflection can facilitate this clarity. According to Augustine, this reflection allows the act
of judgment to separate sin from sinner, an examination of conscience which prevents sin
from becoming a definitional element of identity. Only when this reflection is applied
transitively, then, can judgment be carried out in a way that respects the humanity of a
sinner over the evil of a particular sin. And at this juncture, judgment ceases to condemn,
if it is even judgment at all, but instead moves toward acceptance and reconciliation: go
forth, and sin no more.
Given Augustine’s understanding of judgment, then, capital punishment, an
extreme form of condemnation, is morally untenable. A penalty of death removes the
humanity which true reflection upon judgment separates from the sins of humanity, thus
making it impossible for punishment to advance beyond sin itself. Augustine, therefore,
concludes the following about the death penalty:
Do not, therefore, when you are attacking the sin, put the human being to
death. Avoid the death penalty, so that there’s someone left to repent.
Don’t allow the human being to be killed; then someone will be left to
learn the lesson.9
After punishment, someone, some human person, Augustine emphasizes, must be left to
repent for his/her sin, rather than end in it. Furthermore, if one passes the judgment of
death on another for a particular sin, the judgment ends in sin as well, as justice is a mere

9

Ibid.
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response in sin, rather than redemption of it. In this sense, judgment is not a righteous
activity entirely separate from the sin upon which it deliberates, but a practice intricately
tied to humanity. “If you take action against the crime in order to liberate the human
being,” Augustine writes in his 153rd letter to Macedonius, “you bind yourself to him in a
fellowship of humanity rather than injustice.”10 Judges are linked to those they judge, not
only in the factual matter of judgment, but in the humanity that fundamentally joins them.
If consideration of the crime itself outweighs the understanding of humanity present in
the mind of a judge, then injustice ensues. Judgment, according to Augustine, should
become an act of humanity-focused reformation, rather than a determination of sin in one
sinner by another. Judgment that does justice, therefore, should exclude the recourse of
capital punishment, which degrades and destroys humanity.
Given Augustine’s recognition of the prevalence of sin in the human condition,
however, and his hesitancy to endorse the judgment of sinners by sinners, a seemingly
impossible societal need emerges: for some human person or body to assume the duty of
judging humanity. For this entity to be possible on Augustine’s terms, it would not only
have to be aware of its own faults and humanity, but committed in judgment to the
humanity of wrongdoers as demonstrated through the ability to separate an individual’s
wrongdoing from their person. Despite this seeming impossibility, however, Augustine
believes the divine authority of the State answers this societal need. In establishing this
authority in his consideration of Psalm 2:10, he turns to Paul’s words in Romans 13:

10

Ibid., 73.
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Let every person be subordinate to the higher authorities, for there is no
authority except from God, and those that exist have been established by
God. Therefore, whoever resists authority opposes what God has
appointed, and those who oppose it will bring judgment upon
themselves.11
In essence, God remains the ultimate authority. Transitively, however, he invests his
authority in the governing bodies of society, establishing a structure by which humanity
can judge itself, though only with the understanding that the structure comes through and
from divine authority. Although Augustine acknowledges the human flaws of those who
assume this divinely-given authority through judgment, he nonetheless implores those
subject to bodies of authority to comply with their governance. “For either you act justly,
and a just authority will praise you,” he proposes, “or else, when you act justly, even if an
unjust authority condemns you, God, who is just, will crown you.”12 The failsafe to the
potentially unjust actions of governing authorities is God himself, the true author of
redemptive justice. Citizens submitting to governing bodies, therefore, should have no
trial of conscience in accepting their authority. Thus, governing entities within society,
though admittedly imperfect, are given authority and the capacity to pass judgment, along
with the expectation that authority is exercised in a way that promotes the general life and
well-being of humanity.
In order to promote life, governing authorities, particularly those in Augustine’s
5th century society, have taken (and still take) certain measures to protect life and ensure
11
12

NAB, Romans 13:1-2. Augustine, Political Writings, 123.
Ibid.

9

safety given the sinful and violent nature of humanity. For this reason, Augustine
authorizes the legality of capital punishment as a means of legitimate defense (a concept
discussed at length in Chapter 2), given the need for a punishment in his time that
removed lethal offenders from society in order to protect the lives of the general citizen
population. In the first book of City of God, he specifically addresses authority’s capacity
to defend:
The same divine authority that forbids the killing of a human being
establishes certain exceptions, as when God authorizes killing by a general
law or when He gives an explicit commission to an individual for a limited
time.13
Augustine believed state executions were a direct translation of God’s will in certain
instances, despite his wish that executions not occur. Given the societal conditions of his
time and the divinely-given authority of the state, executions were a necessary evil – evil
because homicide, as he indicates, is a forbidden wrong, despite its apparent necessity.
With this understanding, Augustine stipulates an exception for those who kill on behalf of
the state, separating executors from the inherent sin of their action:
The agent who executes the killing does not commit homicide; he is an
instrument as is the sword with which he cuts. Therefore, it is in no way
contrary to the commandment, 'Thou shalt not kill' to wage war at God's

13

St. Augustine of Hippo, The City of God against the Pagans (New York: Cambridge University Press,
1998), 33.

10

bidding, or for the representatives of public authority to put criminals to
death, according to the law, that is, the will of the most just reason.14
Referencing Romans 13:4, Augustine extends his reflection on Paul’s earlier words in the
epistle. Because agents of execution are truly agents of the state, which, fundamentally, is
an agent of divine authority, state executioners, and those who authorize their actions, do
not truly commit homicide when ending the lives of aggressive criminals. In fact, the law
that provides for their action – the law of the state which sanctions the penalty of death –
is an expression of “the will of the most just reason,” a will that, as Augustine indicates,
can come from God alone. The state and its agents, therefore, are instruments of God’s
will, and their actions of execution are justified accordingly.
Augustine does not, however, suggest that the divinely-given authority of the state
removes its autonomy, and that capital punishment, though a necessary societal defense,
is the right way of justice, though he acknowledges its legality and justification. As
indicated above, he emphasizes the need for punishment to separate sin from sinner in
order to preserve and redeem the lives of wrongdoers – to leave someone to learn the
lesson, rather than end their along with the lesson. When his statements on capital
punishment are understood holistically (as they are often not), it is the justice found in
writing with a finger in the ground that carries the weight of a wooden club, not the
necessary evil of state execution carried out by instruments of the sword. Augustine’s
justice, though it accepts the need to legitimately defend society, is not a virtue of
condemnation. Instead, given the sins of humanity, justice is corrective and redemptive,

14

Ibid.
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rather than an expression of retributive judgment. In many ways, Augustine’s conception
of justice mirrors that of Thomas Aquinas, partners in foundational Church teaching on
the subject. In the 13th century, eight centuries following Augustine’s primacy, Aquinas
wrote the Summa Theologiae, in which he asks many of Augustine’s questions and forms
his own definition of justice, particularly as applied to capital punishment. Like
Augustine, he acknowledges the need to defend society from wrongdoers, but not without
a true understanding of the purpose of punishment: correction, and not retribution.
Justice, according to Aquinas, is in part commutative, and yet largely distributive.
“Justice,” he defines, “is a stable and lasting willingness to do the just thing for
everyone.”15 Actions, therefore, are not only relevant in the effect they have on the
individuals who perform them, but in the resulting effect for communities and societies as
a whole. Commutative justice, which determines individuals’ statuses from an arithmetic
derivation of interactions between each other, differs in scope from distributive justice’s
focus on the balance and equality individuals’ actions bring to their community. The idea
of quid pro quo – “something for something” – which calls for an equal and opposite
reaction for every action from one individual to another, derives first from an
understanding commutative justice. Restated, quid pro quo often becomes “an eye for an
eye,” a standard of commutative justice that those who support capital punishment often
hold (more to come on “an eye for an eye” in Chapter 2). Quid pro quo, however, cannot
be understood correctly without incorporating certain elements of distributive justice. “In
all cases commutative justice demands equality of recompense,” Aquinas establishes,
15

St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, Trans. Timothy McDermott (Notre Dame, IN: Christian
Classics (Ave Maria Press), 1989), 383.
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“but not necessarily an eye for an eye, i.e. returning the identical action: status
differences enter in, and simple restitution of property stolen would not inflict a loss on
the thief nor compensate for the damage done to public safety.”16 Said differently,
commutative justice, which Aquinas first promulgates, cannot exist without a necessary
element of distributive justice: a thorough understanding of the human individuals
(commutative) who engage in larger relationships and action together (distributive).
Aquinas sees capital punishment, therefore, as a necessary remedy, in some
instances, to restore both commutative and distributive standards of justice. “When one
can’t restore the equal of what has been taken,” he explains, “recompense must be made
as far as possible” in order fulfill the writ of quid pro quo.17 “As far as possible,” as
Aquinas and both his society and contemporary communities conventionally understand
it, is the intent of imposing the penalty of death, or taking, in commutative terms, a life
for a life. Capital punishment, according to Aquinas, can be a necessary measure of
societal justice, and he proposes the following:
If a man is a danger to the community[,] threatening it with disintegration
by some wrongdoing (murder) of his, then his execution for the healing
and preservation of the general good is commendable. In doing wrong[,]
men depart from the order laid down by reason, falling away from their
human dignity in which they are by nature free and exist for their own
sake.18

16

Ibid., 388.
Ibid.
18
Ibid., 389.
17

13

The death penalty, in his view, can both heal and preserve; it can both mend the societal
pain murder brings, and protect a society from additional murder as well. When an
individual makes the choice to murder another, Aquinas also asserts that that individual
sacrifices the freedom of autonomy of human dignity, the virtue Augustine stresses as the
core of every individual. Aquinas, does not suggest, however, that individuals’ human
dignity disappears irretrievably. Rather, he entrusts the dignity of malefactors to the
public authority, much like Augustine looks to agents of divinely-given authority to step
in and protect society as needed.
Both Augustine and Aquinas, therefore, consent to the basic principles of
legitimate defense as applicable to capital punishment. Aquinas bases his argument for
legitimate defense on the concept of “double effect,” a relationship that remains today the
Church’s expressed reasoning in allowing capital punishment in very limited
circumstances.19 “An act of self-defence may have two effects: it may save one’s own life
and cost the attacker his,” Aquinas delineates.20 Conceptually, the public authority, dutybound to defend society, may have to take the life of an offender in order to protect the
lives of society, the latter motivation intended, the former a necessary act of protection.21
State executions, according to Aquinas, are never a preferred action, but given the double
effect of self-defense, can sometimes become necessary in order to truly protect and
promote societal life. “The only people who may deliberately kill in self-defence are
those with public authority to do so for the general good,” Aquinas specifies, arriving at

19

See the Catechism of the Catholic Church, par. 2263.
Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, 390.
21
Ibid.
20
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the same conclusion Augustine reaches regarding the transference of divine, judicial
authority.22 Similarly, at this juncture, the duty of the agent of public authority who
carries out a state execution is not a commutative action of murder which weighs on the
conscience of bearer of the sword. Rather, state executions are a distributive measure of
justice, and for Aquinas, a necessary, albeit regrettable, action of legitimate self-defense
by society aimed at restoring quid pro quo as far as possible.
Many stop reading, or stop remembering, Aquinas at this point, subscribing to
quid quo pro alone and finding the supposed backing for the death penalty they seek in
his writing. In the same way, many start reading Augustine in City of God, establish the
divinely-given authority of the sword to carry out state executions, and pay no attention
to his reflections upon Jesus and the adulteress in John 8, content with his statements on
Romans 13 alone. These individuals start and stop reading Paul in Romans 13, but should
understand Paul more thoroughly (as I discuss in Chapter 2), and read him more widely,
much like they should both Augustine and Aquinas. After establishing the groundwork
for double effect and self-defense, Aquinas concludes his discussion of capital
punishment and justice with the following sentiment:
Penalties imposed in this life are corrective rather than retributive, for
retribution is reserved to God’s judgment. So men should not be sentenced
to death in this life for fatal sins […]23
These sentences, though rarely quoted or referenced, best outline Aquinas’ position
regarding capital punishment, more than quid pro quo, more than double effect.
22
23

Ibid.
Ibid., 391.
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Retribution, he states, or true authority of judgment, as Augustine establishes, belongs to
God, and God alone. Restorative measures of human judgment and punishment, rather,
must be corrective in nature and instituted only under the transitive property of divine
authority which Augustine and Aquinas place in the state when necessary. Aquinas, like
Augustine, understands the hideous and atrocious nature of murder – which, in reality,
will never have an equal answer in murder, quid pro quo – and, therefore, permit the rare
instance of death as punishment, which, in their societies, was necessary to promote life.
Augustine and Aquinas, however, should not be construed as the full-fledged
advocates for the death penalty that many often see. Their guiding question is truly not
“Is capital punishment permissible?” but instead “What can be done to best promote life
and justice in society?” and for both, corrective punishment recurs thematically as much
or more than the infrequent necessity of the death penalty. For Augustine, discussions of
punishment and justice, at their core, must hold true to love for humanity:
Why are you destroying the person you judge by failing to love him? For
you’re destroying justice by failing to love the person you’re judging.
Punishments should be imposed; I don’t deny it; I don’t forbid it. But this
must be done in the spirit of love, in the spirit of concern, in the spirit of
reform. 24
Do today’s agents of the sword, divinely authorized to carry out state executions as
needed, see their actions as outcomes of love? These agents back their actions with
Augustine’s words, and in some instances, rightfully so. In other instances, however,

24

Augustine, Political Writings, 125 (emphasis supplied).
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agents neglect the spirits of love and reform, mistakenly assuming the role of grand
retributor. It remains true that Augustine and Aquinas acknowledged the permissibility of
capital punishment in their societies. Their statements, however, statements that outline
the earliest Church teaching regarding capital punishment, should be taken in the larger
context in which they view punishment as primarily corrective, urging the patience of
love and reform in those so eager to cast the first stone.

17

II
Moses, Machaira, and Bloodless Means:
Scriptural and Catechismal Approaches to Capital Punishment

Official teaching of the Catholic Church on a variety of subjects, including capital
punishment, frequently stands upon two pillars: Sacred Tradition and Sacred Scripture.
Augustine and Aquinas, for example, are two of the Church’s most frequent Traditional
contributors, and as indicated, Scripture plays a dominant role in their consideration of
the death penalty. As Catholics look to the Church for teaching, they recurrently research
Traditional and Scriptural foundations. These pillars, as described together in the
Catechism of the Catholic Church, reflect the transmitted will and teaching of Christ:
Sacred Tradition and Sacred Scripture, then, are bound closely together
and communicate with the other. For both of them, flowing out of the
divine well-spring, come together in some fashion to form one thing and
move towards the same goal. Each of them makes present and useful in
the Church the mystery of Christ.25
Thus, Tradition and Scripture, united sources of divine knowledge, collaborate to instruct
and inform Catholics as to the nature and intention of Christ’s mystery and the Church’s
teaching which stems from it, teaching that addresses everything from sacramental graces
and the Eucharist to social issues such as the death penalty. It is vitally necessary,
25

Catechism of the Catholic Church, Libreria Editrice Vaticana (New York: First Image Books
(Doubleday), 1997), par. 80.

18

therefore, that a consideration of Church teaching regarding capital punishment involves
both Traditional and Scriptural voices, helpful resources as Catholics discern matters of
capital significance within their consciences.
Scriptural foundations for capital punishment are a matter of interpretive
contention. Proponents of capital punishment frequently cite Scriptural evidence as
backing for their arguments in favor of state executions. Those who oppose capital
punishment, however, argue that Biblical passages that seemingly support capital
punishment often retain an alternative meaning when read in the proper context and
original language (rather than as an isolated English translation). Biblical authorities
discuss capital punishment in various instances – Old Testament and New, Gospel and
Epistle, Minor and Major Prophet – and in various applications, cultures, and time
periods. Among the many Scriptural passages that are relevant in some capacity to
consideration of the death penalty, 26 two passages, Leviticus 24:17-21 and Romans 13:34, are most frequently debated among those for and against capital punishment. These
passages, given their contentious language and interpretation, have highlighted the
Church’s engagement with Scripture in developing its position toward capital
punishment.
Supporters of capital punishment often rely upon an understood Biblical sanction
of “an eye for an eye, a life for a life” as justification for the death penalty. This phrase
references Leviticus 24:17-21, which reads in full as follows:

26

Although not discussed here, Exodus 21:23-25, Deuteronomy 16:18, and Romans 12:19 are other
passages that have raised significant discussion among those deliberating the Biblical merits of capital
punishment.
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Whoever takes the life of any human being shall be put to death; whoever
takes the life of an animal shall make restitution of another animal. A life
for a life! Anyone who inflicts an injury on his neighbor shall receive the
same in return. Limb for limb, eye for eye, tooth for tooth! The same
injury that a man gives another shall be inflicted on him in return.
Whoever slays an animal shall make restitution, but whoever slays a man
shall be put to death.27
If the passage is read and applied literally, the contrived meaning is relatively
straightforward: if a man kills, he should be killed (an analogous relationship to Aquinas’
quid pro quo). Biblically, however, Moses introduces this law in Leviticus as one of
limitation for the people of Israel, rather than a specific mandate. Moses intended the law
not as a specific order (as in a murder must be answered with death), but as a limitation
on the public response to murder (so that only one death, rather than multiple executions,
could be justified as punishment for murder). If understood in the original Hebrew, the
passage would then read, “If a man takes the life of any human being, he alone must be
put to death … not more than an eye for an eye, not more than a tooth for a tooth…”28
Dale Recinella, in The Biblical Truth about America’s Death Penalty, discusses
interpretations of Leviticus that account for historical context. “When the ‘eye for an eye,
life for a life’ of the Mosaic law is properly understood in its biblical-historical context,”
Recinella explains, “we see that capital punishment may not have been God’s ideal.
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Rather, the death penalty may have been allowed in limited form in the Mosaic law
because of the people’s hardness of heart.”29 By hardness of heart, Recinella references
the Biblically-founded condition of brokenness and violence in Hebrew society. In
limiting the punishment for murder to the retributive death of the initial transgressor
alone, Mosaic law ushered in a momentous change as described in Leviticus – change
that moved to decrease violence, rather than promulgate it.
Not only is the law of capital punishment in Leviticus one of cultural limitation,
but given its context in the wider realm of Mosaic law, it belongs in the larger group of
ancient laws which have fallen out of practice as society has evolved. Mosaic law not
only sanctioned taking a life for a life, but held a multitude of other crimes (adultery,
sorcery, idolatry, etc.) punishable by death and endorsed various methods of capital
punishment (hanging, stoning, and public burning, to name a few). Most, if not all of
these practices – take, for example, the stoning of rebellious children by their parents and
fellow townspeople, a Biblically founded practice30 – no longer meet any standard of
common human decency (particularly in the American context) and no longer have any
legal or statutorial foundation. Within Mosaic law, capital punishment provided by the
Leviticus limitation (the execution of a convicted murderer, not a rapist, kidnapper,
fornicator, sorcerer, idolater, perjurer, false prophet, or Sabbath-day worker, executions
for whom Mosaic Law also provides in Scripture)31 belongs within this group, though
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proponents of capital punishment still cling to Moses’s words in Leviticus as a legal
mandate for the death penalty. “Who picked murder as the only item off the list that God
really mandates for execution [today]?” Recinella questions. “If we used the whole list
from the Mosaic law, who in America would not have coworkers, friends from church, or
members of their home community executed? Who in America would be left to pull the
switch?”32 Mosaic law approved public executions for a variety of wrongs, wrongs that,
if still punishable by death today, would obstruct the American legal system beyond
function. Murder was one of these wrongs, and though the larger group of wrongs has
been rejected quite clearly in today’s system of law, murder remains punishable by death
today, approved by many under the Scriptural pretense of “a life for a life.”
Although it speaks to a starkly different cultural demographic than Moses does in
Leviticus, many read Paul’s New Testament letter to the Romans as an explicit Biblical
command for governments to exercise their authority to take a life for a life. Paul wrote
to the Romans between 55-60 A.D., a time in which he and other Roman citizens
understood capital punishment via decapitation by the sword as the only means of
execution allowed to the state. Addressing a Roman church of both Jews and Gentiles,
Paul asserts the following in Romans 13:3-4:
For rulers are not a cause of fear to good conduct, but to evil. Do you wish
to have no fear of authority? Then do what is good and you will receive
approval from it, for it is a servant of God for your good. But if you do
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evil, be afraid, for it does not bear the sword without purpose; it is the
servant of God to inflict wrath on the evildoer.33
If the ruling authority (in Paul’s case, Rome, but in many popular readings of the passage,
current government) can bring wrath upon evildoers by the sword, Paul’s words
seemingly provide some support for a state-authored death penalty. Furthermore, Paul’s
prescription of authority, as Recinella indicates, is extra-biblical, meaning it exists in a
manner that transcends the Biblical harbor of Mosaic law. Though many accept the
Mosaic tenet of a “life for a life,” Paul’s authority of the sword, if understood literally,
goes beyond its Scriptural context: an established maxim that can be governmentally
owned even today.
But Paul’s words, much like Moses’s in Leviticus, must be understood at a level
beyond their literal, English-based interpretation. Analyses of the passage typically focus
on two words: first, “sword,” the weapon by which the state can bring executions; and
second, “inflict,” more commonly “execute” in other translations of the Greek.34 Turning
first to Paul’s reference to the sword, two Greek words are typically translated into
Biblical “swords.” The first is rhomphaia, the Greek word for the saber-like, long, and
broad cutlass typically used in Pauline society to perform capital executions. The other is
machaira, a dagger or short sword typically sheathed on a belt and used as a symbol for
the authority of courts to inflict punishment (but not the sword used to behead, and
certainly not a symbol of beheading). Paul uses machaira in his original letter to the
33
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Romans, rather than the rhomphaia Greeks used to decapitate. Those who read “sword”
in English translations can, therefore, mistakenly take Paul’s translated word as the
signfier to a weapon of death, whereas it actually signifies the state’s ability to carry out
more general punishment on a societal level, the true referent. And Paul’s sword does not
“execute,” as some translations suggest, nor does it “inflict wrath” in the final sense of
execution that some interpret. Rather, in this instance, the original Greek does not even
include the verb that English translators have placed in the passage. “Execute” has been
used in some passages, and “inflict” in others, but both with the same intentional
meaning: “to carry out, to perform,” or “to apply.”35 Paul’s original Greek verb does not
exist in English, and English translators’ inserted verb does not connote execution;
instead, the passage identifies the state’s fundamental responsibilities of protection and
justice. Given this context, Recinella offers a more accurate understanding of Paul’s
instruction to the Romans:
When we properly understand Romans 13:4 […] it is clear that the verse
contains no mandate for capital punishment. It does not support the power
of judicial authority to impose punishment upon malefactors. Our prisons
are full of felons who are experiencing judicially imposed punishment
without being subject to the death penalty. There is no need to impose
capital punishment in order to be faithful to the proper understanding of
Romans 13:4.36

35
36

Recinella, The Biblical Truth about America’s Death Penalty, 97.
Ibid., 98.

24

Paul’s Scriptural statements – like Moses’s – do not explicitly authorize capital
punishment as it is currently practiced, despite frequent readings and interpretations
otherwise.
In sum, Church teaching reflecting Scripture does not find explicit basis for a
position in favor of capital punishment. And for Catholics looking to Biblical sources for
guidance in reconciling their personal consciences regarding the death penalty, Moses
and Paul are not the staunch advocates for state executions many literal readers of their
words make them out to be. But what about Tradition, the Church’s other pillar of
teaching; how does it address the state’s authority to execute and the morality of capital
executions in themselves? Do Traditional voices fall in unison with Scripture, contrary to
it, or complicate it somehow? As can be read in the preceding chapter, Augustine and
Aquinas offer positions toward capital punishment that generally align with those of
Moses and Paul. They outwardly support capital punishment in specific circumstances. In
some instances, they authorize the taking of a life for another life, and they view the state
as the proper vehicle of authority to do so. The official teaching of the Catholic Church
toward capital punishment holds true to many of Augustine and Aquinas’ arguments, as it
has since they were initially written. The Catechism of the Catholic Church (CCC) , the
complete document of dogmatic instruction for Catholics worldwide, places Augustine
and Aquinas’s words on the death penalty in conversation with those spoken by Moses
and Paul, and on a larger scale, weighs together contributing elements of both Tradition
and Scripture pertaining to capital punishment. For this reason, the CCC, along with
Augustine, Aquinas, and the voices present in the chapters that follow this one, can be
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read as Traditional expressions of the Church regarding capital punishment, sources that
combine with Scripture to author the Church’s position toward the death penalty.
Just as Scriptural translations have evolved over time, so also has the CCC
changed as Church teaching has been modified and Traditional sources reevaluated. The
Council of Trent’s Roman Catechism of 1566, for example, published under Pope Pius V,
gives civil authorities the “‘power of life and death’” in order to protect society from
malefactors through a “‘kind of lawful slaying.’”37 The catechisms following, published
recurrently over the next 450 years, echoed much of the original position toward capital
punishment articulated at the Council of Trent in the 16th century. Until 1992, the CCC
explicitly stated, “The traditional teaching of the Church has acknowledged as wellfounded the right and duty of legitimate authority to punish malefactors by means of
penalties commensurate with the gravity of the crime, not excluding, in cases of extreme
gravity, the death penalty.”38 This nominal reference to the death penalty, and the
meaning of retribution that accompanies it, remained in the CCC until the 1997 revisions
that produced the version currently read and held by Catholics worldwide today. These
revisions, written in light of Pope John Paul II’s 1995 encyclical Evangelium Vitae (see
Chapter 3), re-center the Church’s teaching regarding capital punishment on Aquinas’s
principle of double-effect and the subject of legitimate defense. In the present CCC, the
Church moves away from Traditional considerations of the death penalty as punishment,
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instead shifting toward a view of capital punishment as a rarely plausible means of
defending and protecting society from imminent criminal danger.
The present CCC, when read with its 1997 revisions, expresses a position toward
the death penalty that significantly departs from past versions, while simultaneously
maintaining a continuous line of voice with Aquinas, Scriptural influence, and other
Traditional sources. In this sense, as E. Christian Brugger states in “Rejecting the Death
Penalty: Continuity and Change in the Tradition,” the 1997-revised CCC presents definite
changes in Church teaching, changes that can be easily identified, while presenting the
changes in a manner that does not stray away from the traditional teaching that formed
the initial position. Brugger’s essay outlines many of these changes. First, the CCC
section pertaining to capital punishment (within Article 5, “The Fifth Commandment,” of
Chapter 2, “You Shall Love Your Neighbor As Yourself,” of Section 2, “The Ten
Commandments,” of Part 3, “Life in Christ,” starting at number 2263), is titled
“legitimate defense,” rather than “punishment,” as it was traditionally named.39 The
change in title takes the initial CCC discussion of capital punishment out of its section
dedicated to punishment and incorporates it in its doctrine of defense. In doing so, it
specifies that the death penalty does not escape the Catechismal prohibition of intentional
killing or murder of the innocent.40 The CCC then very deliberately presents its discuss
of capital punishment in the context of legitimate defense:
The defense of the common good requires that an unjust aggressor be
rendered unable to cause harm. For this reason, those who legitimately
39
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hold authority also have the right to use arms to repel aggressors against
the civil community entrusted to their responsibility.41
In emphasizing the legitimacy of civil authority to defend society, the CCC bases the
action required to abate the unjust aggression of offenders in the words of Paul,
Augustine, and many traditional Church voices. This emphasis, by indicating that the
state must punish offenders to defend society, reserves any authority to exercise capital
punishment to the state, but does so without establishing any expectation upon the state to
carry out the death penalty regardless of societal circumstance.
At this juncture, therefore, the CCC adds in the redemptive quality of punishment
required by legitimate defense:
Punishment, then, in addition to defending the public order and protecting
people’s safety, has a medicinal purpose: as far as possible, it must
contribute to the correction of the guilty party.42
The redemptive, corrective, and medicinal purposes of punishment significantly nuance
the state’s duty to defend. Punishment must have, as Aquinas explains in Summa
Theologiae, a double effect, but in a new sense: it must protect society while
supplementing efforts to rehabilitate an aggressor.43 Punishment cannot be a retributive
end in itself (as prior Catechismal teaching indicated), but must serve dually as a means
of reconciliation for offenders. The principle of double-effect and its implication of
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redemption, then, guide a key rewrite in the 1997 CCC’s final section on capital
punishment:
Assuming the guilty party’s identity and responsibility have been fully
determined, the traditional teaching of the Church does not exclude
recourse to the death penalty, if this is the only possible way of effectively
defending human lives against the unjust aggressor.44
By prefacing its “last option” consideration of the death penalty with the standard of
determination of an aggressor’s person and act (an effort to establish clear and
convincing guilt as a necessary prerequisite to any consideration of a capital execution),
and by following the specific mentioning of the death penalty with a final possibility for
avoidance (one last push for a bloodless societal defense), the CCC starkly diverges from
the 1992 section discussed earlier in which it contextualized capital punishment as a
potential recompense fitting if “commensurate with the gravity of the crime.” Instead, the
1997 CCC’s change brings a consideration of “non-lethal means” to the forefront, casting
the death penalty as a final and reserved measure that finds application only when nonlethal means are neither sufficient nor possible as defense.45
Finally, taking directly from Evangelium Vitae, the CCC makes it most definitive
statement concerning the legitimacy of capital punishment. It concludes with the
following:
Today, in fact, as a consequence of the possibilities which the state has for
effectively preventing crime, by rendering one who has committed an
44
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offense incapable of doing harm – without definitively taking away from
him the possibility of redeeming himself – the cases in which the
execution of the offender is an absolute necessity “are very rare, if not
practically non-existent.”46
The CCC uses Pope John Paul II’s exact words in making its final statement, and uses his
commitment to the dignity and redemption of the human person present throughout
Evangelium Vitae to reason the remainder of the passage. In doing so, the CCC allows for
rare and hardly possible cases in which state executions of offenders might be necessary.
Clear emphasis, however, rests in the state’s contemporary ability to combat crime
through the incapacitation of offenders and their rehabilitation, rather than in the option
for execution that the CCC presents. The 1997 CCC changes in its section addressing
capital punishment ends in this statement of near finality, an argument that marks a trend
toward a view that sees no need for capital punishment given the corrective abilities of
the state in the modern world.
In both deviating in a concrete manner from past versions and maintaining certain
continuity with them, the present, 1997-modified version of the CCC holds capital
executions as means of legitimate societal defense that have increasingly limited (if at all
existent) application in contemporary systems of corrective justice. The CCC’s statement
of increasing limitation, interestingly enough, much resembles that of Moses’s in
Leviticus, as both suggest capital executions as reserved and better avoided ends in the
hope that society can settle on means that avoid ending life. Despite past versions,
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translations, or other arguments that speak to the contrary, Traditional and Scriptural
voices do not outwardly advocate for the death penalty, but more so for the authority and
responsibility (Paul’s machaira) of the state to defend society through redemptive, rather
than retributive, justice. Attention therefore turns to bloodless means – incarceration,
rehabilitation, and reconciliation for offenders and unjust aggressors. Catholics find a
recurring central message in both Traditional and Scriptural voices, particularly as stated
in the CCC: if life can be safely preserved, executions should be avoided in response to
capital crimes. This message has become the central teaching of the Church regarding the
death penalty. It reflects not only the legitimate authority and responsibility of defense as
discussed in the Scriptural and Traditional foundations outlined in this chapter, but a
larger movement toward respecting and protecting the sanctity of all human life that
underlies Pope John Paul II’s statements in Evangelium Vitae and the words of those who
advocate for a consistent ethic of life.
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III
Tragic Cases and the Consistent Ethic of Life:
Contemporary Catholic Thought and Teaching on Capital Punishment

The Consistent Ethic of Life, though rooted in and directly connected with
Scripture and Tradition, is a relatively recent movement in Catholic social teaching. 47
Marvin Mich, in Catholic Social Teaching and Movements, describes the emergence of
the Consistent Ethic of Life in Catholic circles as “articulated almost simultaneously in
different places by very different people,” discussing the work of various activists,
clergymen and women, interest groups, and miscellaneous members of the laity in
promoting a new understanding of social issues involving the well-being of human
lives. 48 Numerous efforts throughout the United States in the 1970s and 1980s –
including, as Mich lists, creation of a Feminists for Life (FFL) group in Ohio, media
advocacy from the North Carolina-based Seamless Garment Network (SGN),49 and
various donative and funding-oriented initiatives dedicated to the movement’s cause
through the Diocese of Rochester, New York – seem to corroborate his description.50 The
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true figurehead of the movement, however, was Joseph Cardinal Bernardin, Archbishop
of Chicago during the creation of the movement and the height of its popularization. In
1988, Bernardin published Consistent Ethic of Life, a compilation of his various writings
and speeches on matters of social import to the movement. In it, he states, “A consistent
ethic of life is based on the need to ensure that the sacredness of human life, which is the
ultimate source of human dignity, will be defended and fostered from womb to tomb,
from the genetic laboratory to the cancer ward, from the ghetto to the prison.”51
Bernardin’s powerful use of the movement’s rhetoric combines with a genuine sincerity
to demonstrably indicate why he became the chief spokesperson for the consistent ethic
of life and the mind behind the movement. His work, in a sense, reflects an evolved
version of his original vocational ambition – a career in medicine – in that it seeks to
preserve and protect all life, no matter the situation and condition.
In Consistent Ethic of Life, Bernardin included “The Death Penalty in Our Time,”
an adaptation of an address given to the Criminal Law Committee of the Criminal Court
of Cook County. In it, he considers the ethic’s implication for capital punishment in
contemporary society. Bernardin’s statements preface Pope John Paul II’s Evangelium
Vitae in 1995 and the subsequent Catechismal revisions of 1997, establishing much of the
language and thinking present in the teaching of the Church as it has evolved toward the
death penalty at the close of the twentieth century and into the present context.
Identifying his remarks as those of a concerned citizen and pastor, Bernardin first
distinguishes his “longstanding conviction that civil law and social policy must always be
51
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subject to ongoing moral analysis.”52 This conviction, in essence, represents the Church’s
larger motivation for promulgating a consistent ethic for life in secular affairs, asserting
the need for a moral voice in evaluating policies and processes that affect the sanctity and
well-being of human life. Bernardin takes care to note, however, that he is not a lawyer,
and the Church is not a legislative body. But for capital punishment to be holistically
evaluated, as he suggests, it cannot be seen as an exclusively political issue or a measure
of correctional justice alone. The death penalty is a human construct, and moral questions
underlay its societal foundation.
Bernardin’s analysis, therefore, is morally grounded. The principal issue, in his
case, is not one of politics. He does not dispute the right of the state to execute criminals
– he knows that Catholic Tradition, and the U.S. Constitution (at least by some
interpretations), have established it does – but opposes the state’s choice to exercise its
accepted right.53 The authority of the state to perform executions is much less important
than what is done by way of authority, and the human life that the authority governs.
Instead, his discourse centers on another guiding question: “In present circumstances, are
there sufficient reasons to justify the infliction of the evil of death on another human
person?54” He frames his discussion by asking, in other words, if killing can ever be
morally justified, regardless of the guilt, innocence, or identity of a potential victim. Can
a human being ever, regardless of the circumstances involved, kill another human being?
Bernardin recognizes four chief arguments by which the state traditionally answers his
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question affirmatively, defending its exercise of its privileged right to execute:
retribution, deterrence, reform, and societal protection. He finds, however, that these
arguments, when applied in present society, are no longer morally justifiable. Bloodless
means, such as life imprisonment, adequately protect society from criminals while
allowing for potential reconciliation, a possibility society has evolved to accommodate.
The violence of a state execution, Bernardin reasons, is not retributive as a response to
violence. And similarly, a violent penalty of death does not deter violence, but
encourages it, a counterintuitive contribution to the cyclical violence the state aims to
dissuade through capital punishment.55
In Bernardin’s view, the general causes the state has found throughout history for
capital punishment are no longer morally justifiable. “It seems to me and others that, in
our culture today, there are not sufficient reasons to justify the State continuing to
exercise its right in this manner,” he firmly concludes. “There are other, better ways of
protecting the interests of society.”56 What is needed, from Bernardin’s perspective, is
movement away from the state’s allowed right of execution to a search for improved
means of addressing capital crimes in society. These “better ways” step outside the cycle
of violence and give offenders an opportunity to change through life, rather than end in
death. But are these better ways ample punishment given the heinous nature of killing a,
or multiple, fellow human being(s)? Bernardin responds:
I am not suggesting that society should be a prisoner of violence or violent
crime. On the contrary, the consistent ethic of life requires that society
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struggle to eradicate poverty, racism, and other systematic forces which
nurture and encourage violence. Similarly, the perpetrators of violence
should be punished and given the opportunity to experience a change of
heart and mind.57
A line can be drawn, Bernardin believes, between responding with force to violence in
society, and responding with so much force that the response becomes paradoxically
violent in itself. A consistent ethic for life requires acceptance of the recurring nature of
violence in human existence; the ethic does not, however, require the necessity of
modeling this violence through responsive action, particularly by the state. A greater end
of societal justice, therefore, can be reached through a moral commitment to punishment
focused on protecting life, rather than the state-sanctioned punishment of violent death.
This moral commitment to life comes not only from reevaluating the violent
nature and supposed merits of capital punishment, but through reinterpreting the power
and authority of those who determine life and death. Bernardin quickly accepts the
present authority and legal right of the state to execute criminals. He takes issue, as
indicated, with the state’s decisions to exercise its right to execute – decisions for which
he strongly calls for reform. Despite his acceptance of the state’s right to execute,
therefore, he outlines a redistribution of the power of execution that shifts it away from
the state to a “higher court,” that of the true author of life and death. 58 He writes:
It is when we stand in this perspective of a “higher court” – that of God’s
judgment seat – and a more noble view of the human person, that we
57
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seriously question the appropriateness of capital punishment. We ask
ourselves: Is the human family made more complete – is human
personhood made more loving – in a society which demands life for life,
eye for eye, tooth for tooth?59
Life is not the state’s to decide to preserve or end; such adjudication is reserved to God,
the highest judge. In this sense, Bernardin suggests the state is actually not authorized to
carry out capital executions. Keeping with the teaching of Augustine, however, he
accepts that the freely endowed, contemporary state inherits the responsibility of the
higher court – even if it should not, based on some perspectives – and that decisions of
life and death become its own. But the state is no longer subject to the violence of Mosaic
society, or an unrelenting absolute of quid pro quo, as Bernardin proposes. Given the
progression of contemporary society, lives can no longer be taken for lives in a morally
justifiable manner. Instead, to promote life, protect it, and as he dictates, to make it more
complete, life cannot be taken away through a punishment that ends it, even in response
to crimes that might seem to warrant such action. Consistently, Bernardin calls for an end
to the death penalty in support of the moral interest of life, as capital punishment deprives
society of life more than it defends the lives within it.
In March of 1995, eight years after Bernardin released Consistent Ethic of Life
and “The Death Penalty in Our Time,” Pope John Paul II issued Evangelium Vitae (“The
Gospel of Life”), a papal encyclical addressing various social issues affecting human life
in contemporary society. In the 1990s, the movement for a consistent ethic of life moved
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out of its foundational stage of the 1970s and past its uprising phase of the 1980s to
become a mainstay philosophy in Catholics’ consideration of social issues, an influential
status that remains today. In Evangelium Vitae, John Paul II, in the true spirit of
Bernardin’s consistent ethic, engages a multitude of social issues – focusing primarily on
abortion, euthanasia, and capital punishment – and, like Bernardin, emphasizes the
inviolability of all human life, regardless of condition, situation, or circumstance. In
Chapter III of the encyclical, entitled “You Shall Not Kill,” John Paul II turns directly to
the matter of capital punishment, framing his discussion around the Fifth Commandment
as referenced (dictated originally, ironically enough, to Moses in the book of Exodus). In
Section 53 of the chapter, he prefaces his direct discussion of the death penalty in the
context of contemporary application of the traditional commandment:
This should not come as a surprise: to kill a human being, in whom the
image of God is present, is a particularly serious sin. Only God is the
master of life! Yet from the beginning, faced with the many and often
tragic cases which occur in the life of individuals and society, Christian
reflection has sought a fuller and deeper understanding of what God’s
commandment prohibits and prescribes. 60
John Paul II begins his analysis with a difficult question: what “tragic cases” in
contemporary society might warrant deviation from the traditionally held norm that
killing is wrong? Given certain tragedies, might killing be morally justified? Like
60
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Bernardin, John Paul II establishes an important principle before delving into discussion
– that God, not humans or the State, is the true master of life – but also accepts
Bernardin’s translation of the principle in contemporary society: that the circumstances of
a free, created society foster an assumption of the duty to promote life on behalf of those
with the authority to exercise the duty.
John Paul II, however, takes Bernardin’s understanding of master and judge one
step further. Prior to discussing tragic cases in Section 53, he states, in Section 52, that
“With regard to things, but even with regard to life, man is not the absolute master and
final judge, but rather – and this is where his incomparable greatness lies – he is the
‘minister of God’s plan,’” quoting Paul VI’s Humanae Vitae (1968).61 “Life is entrusted
to man as a measure which must not be squandered, as a talent that must be used well.
Man must render an account of it to his Master.”62 John Paul II poses the authority to
regulate human life not as a mere societal inheritance, but as an entrustment by God with
the expectation that authority will be exercised in a manner that follows God’s expressed
intent. Through action in line with this expectation, mankind can live up to its quality of
“incomparable greatness.” Like Bernardin, John Paul II acknowledges that man is not the
ultimate authority, but that God is the highest minister of justice, calling for increased
accountability in evaluating actions taken by authoritative figures under the transitive
responsibility of regulating life and death in created society. With this view of societal
authority and the maxim that killing is fundamentally wrong in mind, he moves to
confront what he terms the “genuine paradox”: tragic cases of “legitimate defense, in
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which the right to protect one’s own life and the duty not to harm someone else’s life”
become contrasting motives very difficult to reconcile. 63 In this context, he presents
capital punishment as one of the most complicated of the genuine paradoxes. The death
penalty, generally thought to be applied in situations in which the legitimate motive for
societal (self) defense outweighs that of an expectation never to take the life of another, is
always a tragic case. Among the many tragic cases present in Evangelium Vitae, John
Paul II, with the consistent ethic of life at the forefront of his mind, sets out to resolve
some part of the genuine paradox manifest in the practice of capital punishment in
contemporary society.
He wastes no time in offering partial resolution. “On this matter,” he begins,
referring to the death penalty, “there is a growing tendency, both in the Church and in
civil society, to demand that it be applied in a very limited way or even that it be
abolished completely.”64 This tendency, in his view, comes from the growing
technological and redemptive abilities of penal systems (specifically, the American
system), systems that fall “ever more in line with human dignity.”65 Because societal
authority can safely incapacitate wrongdoers, removing them from society without cause
for fear, and because doing so provides offenders the opportunity for redemption and
rehabilitation, the death penalty becomes an increasingly unnecessary punishment. Thus,
as John Paul II states, societal authority “ought not go to the extreme of executing the
offender except in cases of absolute necessity: in other words, when it would not be
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possible otherwise to defend society.”66 This statement, in essence, sets the framework
for the Church’s current position toward capital punishment. Societal defense, when
understood with Aquinas’ standard of legitimacy, has previously been the Church’s first
concern, one that the State should and does share. Because this concern is increasingly
addressed without the need for state executions, Bernardin, John Paul II, and the
Consistent Ethic of Life movement as a whole advocate a new answer to societal crime,
one that no longer ends a sacred and inviolable life in order to defend others. This answer
completes John Paul II’s discussion of the death penalty:
If bloodless means are sufficient to defend human lives against an
aggressor and to protect public order and the safety of persons, public
authority must limit itself to such means, because they better correspond to
the concrete conditions of the common good and are more in conformity
to the dignity of the human person.67
Authoring the revisions to the CCC discussed prior (Chapter 2) released two years after
his comments in Evangelium Vitae, John Paul II identifies the evolving expectation of
societal corrections: that authorities opt for “bloodless means” over capital executions if
at all possible. And, in all actuality, the question of if the means are sufficient is not John
Paul II’s chief contribution, but rather this answer, that the means are sufficient, and
increasingly necessary. In keeping with the consistent ethic of life, bloodless means of
punishment aimed at redemption and rehabilitation of life constitute true justice for
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humanity, and when permissible in keeping with the principle of legitimate defense, they
should be implemented.
Many, however, still read Evangelium Vitae as an acknowledgement of the
remaining need for capital punishment in certain societal circumstances, emphasizing the
role of the death penalty in “cases of absolute necessity” despite the growing sufficiency
of bloodless means. This reading, though it departs from the trend John Paul II highlights
at the beginning of his discussion of the death penalty, is nonetheless accurate. The
Church (aside from statements by the U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops (USCCB) and
other groups) has yet to call formally for the total abolishment of capital punishment in
contemporary society. In fact, then-Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger, now Pope Benedict XVI,
wrote the following in 2004:
Not all moral issues have the same moral weight as abortion and
euthanasia. For example, if a Catholic were to be at odds with the Holy
Father on the application of capital punishment […] he would not for that
reason be considered unworthy to present himself to receive Holy
Communion. While the Church exhorts civil authorities to […] exercise
discretion and mercy in imposing punishment on criminals, it may still be
permissible to take up arms to repel an aggressor or to have recourse to
capital punishment.68
Nine years following Evangelium Vitae, Ratzinger, like John Paul II, contextualizes the
morality of capital punishment with that of abortion and euthanasia, concluding as John
68
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Paul II does that the death penalty may still be warranted in some tragic cases of
contemporary society (though Ratzinger, in this document, does not take the time and
care to stress the preferential quality of bloodless means that John Paul II does). Thus,
Catholics of today, though encouraged by John Paul II in Evangelium Vitae to understand
the death penalty as a punishment of increasingly limited necessity, retain the freedom to
support it in whatever limited capacity remains. Similarly, authorities retain the freedom
to exercise the death penalty in extreme cases as needed. Some view this freedom
liberally, supporting capital punishment in a variety of apparent necessities; others view it
as a mere precursor to an imminent Church statement calling for abolishment. This
statement, however, remains unseen as of yet, and the death penalty remains an option of
legitimate defense when bloodless means are unavailable.
Evangelium Vitae, and encyclicals like it, are not considered ex cathedra,
meaning that Catholics are not doctrinally bound to accept them, as opposed to doctrines
given with the intention of papal infallibility. Instead, Evangelium Vitae’s standard
requires Catholics to give thoughtful and respectful consideration to whatever teaching
the Pope dictates. The ex cathedra standard does not, however, require Catholics to
integrate teachings and positions into their practice of faith. The Church’s position
regarding the death penalty as presented in Evangelium Vitae, therefore – that instances
in which capital punishment is necessary are very rare, if not practically non-existent in
present society – is not a “binding” position, and if Catholics decide, after thoughtful
consideration, to reject the teaching, they are not obliged to refrain from Holy
Communion, as Cardinal Ratzinger specified in 2004, nor are they unable to practice
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their Catholic faith in other capacities. Some Catholic parties, like the USCCB (see my
discussion of the USCCB statement “A Culture of Life and the Penalty of Death” in
Chapter 6), have called for the Church to make a more definitive statement that binds
Catholics to a position in opposition of the death penalty and promotes the abolishment of
capital punishment in modern, industrialized societies, particularly the United States.
Others, like Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia and Colorado Attorney General John
Suthers, whom I discuss at length in chapters to come, continue to support the death
penalty in contemporary society as Catholics regularly involved in capital legal matters.
John Paul II’s statements in Evangelium Vitae, however, coupled with the recurrence of
the Catholic message as to the corrective nature of punishment throughout time, help to
clarify the Church’s developing teaching regarding the death penalty, even given the
stark contrast in opinions among Catholics. For Catholics, particularly American
Catholics, who elect to support capital punishment in contemporary society, they remain
free to do so, though Evangelium Vitae and the Consistent Ethic of Life movement seem
to suggest their time to do so, from a doctrinal standpoint, is running out. A more
informed understanding of the Church’s statements on the death penalty through time
shows that along with St. Paul, Augustine, and Aquinas, individuals like John Paul II and
Joseph Cardinal Bernardin do not reverse established Church teaching in favor of the
death penalty, but instead renew the spirit of corrective punishment in modern
circumstances, opting for bloodless means given the increasing ability of society to
defend itself.
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INTERMEZZO

Although given to various Catholics at various times throughout history, the
underlying message of St. Paul, Augustine, Aquinas, Joseph Cardinal Bernardin, Pope
John Paul II, and the Church regarding punishment is consistent: it should be corrective,
defensive as needed, and not retributive in nature. The state’s administration of the death
penalty should follow course. The delivery and interpretation of this teaching, as
indicated, is a matter in itself; and its praxis, the transition from teaching to practice and
the relationship therein, is a correlated, yet distinct, activity.
I recently met with Judy Lucero, a Denver-based defense attorney who lives and
works out of her home in the Berkeley neighborhood surrounding Regis University. She
reminded me instantly of Millard Farmer, a defense attorney with whom Sr. Helen
Prejean partners to fight for Patrick Sonnier’s life in Dead Man Walking. (I reference
Millard in Chapter 6.) Judy, like Millard, has a particular interest in capital cases, and her
vocation, as she told me in our meeting, is “redeeming lost souls.”69 After a wide breadth
of career experiences in the law, Judy now elects to work selectively on cases in which
the prosecution seeks the death penalty, a special calling, and for Judy and the other
individuals I discuss in the chapters to come, a fascinating intersection of law, Catholic
faith, and vocation.
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With artwork commemorating Our Lady of Guadalupe on her walls and legal
transcripts and documents in her hands, Judy calmly told me that she thought no one
should die as punishment for killing, and that both her Catholic faith and understanding
of the law demand a higher standard of justice. We spoke at length about a doctrine
known as “death is different” that suggests that the criminal justice system’s treatment of
capital cases and administration of the death penalty, given the processes, actors, and
fundamental questions involved, is strikingly different than all other activities of the
criminal justice system, especially in the United States, and for this reason, capital cases
and questions should be considered with the most extreme care and attention possible. 70
“We have to understand that capital proceedings are fundamentally different than trials
on rape, burglary, or anything else, and for me, the difference stems from the fact that the
life of the accused is resting in the balance.”71 Judy argues as she does and for those she
does in capital cases because death is too different, and her belief in the sanctity of life
that stems from her Catholic faith demands that she advocates for death’s limitation.
Near the end of our meeting, Judy, with her copy of the Catholic catechism and a
motion filed in a capital trial, showed me what it really is that she does. She paged
through the motion, and instructed me to read the following passage:
“Justice” is not a formula, but the name of the reality it expresses – an end
engaging the highest ideal of free persons – irreducible to a strict rule of
law. Justice is its own origin, motive, object, and end. […] The inherent
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power of the court to act in the interest of justice does not exist for the
benefit of the court – such power exists to ensure that the highest ideal of
free persons does not lie dormant and inactive but is engaged to overcome
disparity, dispose to equity, guarantee rights and freedom, and, ultimately,
engender peace.72
She then directed me to the following sections of the CCC. The first comes from the
catechism’s discussion of cardinal virtues, the second from its statements on authority
and the common good.
Justice is the moral virtue that consists in the constant and firm will to give
their due to God and neighbor.73
Authority does not derive its moral legitimacy from itself. It must not
behave in a despotic manner, but must act for the common good as a
“moral force based on freedom and a sense of responsibility.”74
“Do the two passages look at all similar?” Judy asked me. “Because they should – I
modeled the former after the latter.”75
Judy told me that she frequently uses the CCC to found arguments in defense on
behalf of those accused of capital crimes, and quite literally, write faith into work. “I
don’t even really like the law,” Judy told me. “But it’s the only avenue by which I can
pursue my true work.” Needless to say, I was thoroughly impressed, even astounded. I

72

State of Colorado v. Montour, 02CR782, Defendant’s Motion to Declare C.R.S. Section 20-1-107, The
District Attorney Disqualification Statute, Unconstitutional, submitted by Judy Lucero on behalf of the
defendant, 9-11, (copy on file with author).
73
CCC, par. 1807.
74
Ibid., 1902.
75
Lucero, Interview by author.

47

felt for a moment like I was standing not with Judy, but with Thomas Aquinas, and we
were reading and discussing what the natural law should be. Judy is an example of why
death truly is different. In few other instances would attorneys be predisposed to write the
Catholic catechism into their arguments, and in few other instances would some
attorneys, like Judy, feel they have to do so.
What follows here is a discussion of three individuals – Supreme Court Justice
Antonin Scalia, Colorado Attorney General John Suthers, and death penalty abolitionist
Sr. Helen Prejean, all of whom, like Judy, integrate Catholic teaching and their work in
matters of capital significance on a daily basis. Their examples are, like Judy’s, powerful,
unique, and controversial. Their lives answer the question, “As Catholics in the United
States, in consideration of the teaching of the Church on capital punishment, how should
we approach the questions involved in administration of the death penalty?” Their
answers, like death, are markedly different.
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IV
Antonin Scalia and the Machinery of Death:
Weighing Oaths as Catholic and Jurist

On May 21, 1997, almost seventeen years after shooting and killing Allen
Huckleberry, Bruce Edwin Callins died by lethal injection in a Texas execution chamber
as punishment for capital homicide. Seventeen years earlier, on June 27, 1980, Callins
entered Norma’s Lounge, a bar in Tarrant County, Texas, and demanded at gunpoint that
those present surrender all monies and valuables in their possession to him. When
Huckleberry, a patron of the bar, failed to turn over his wallet in a timely manner, Callins
shot him in the neck, took his wallet, and left him to die.76 Callins’ execution came after a
lengthy appeal of his capital sentence in which he petitioned the State of Texas, then
Gary Johnson, Director of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, and ultimately,
James Collins, the director who followed Johnson, for habeas corpus relief given alleged
violation(s) of constitutional due process, and specifically, for bifurcating sentencing at
his state trial, 77 among other alleged acts of undue mistrial.78 Callins first entered his
appeal in the U.S. District Court of Northern Texas, which affirmed the capital sentence,
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and then with the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, which affirmed the ruling of the district
court. After the Fifth’s Circuit affirmation, Callins petitioned the Supreme Court of the
United States for writ of certiorari in the now-infamous Callins v. Collins (1994), but was
denied a hearing.
Dissenting from the majority that refused to hear Callins, Justice Harry
Blackmun, who voted eighteen years prior to reinstate the death penalty in the landmark
Gregg v. Georgia (1976), said the following:
From this day forward, I shall no longer tinker with the machinery of
death. For more than 20 years I have endeavored – indeed, I have
struggled – along with a majority of this Court, to develop procedural and
substantive rules that would lend more than the mere appearance of
fairness to the death penalty endeavor. Rather than continue to coddle the
Court's delusion that the desired level of fairness has been achieved and
the need for regulation eviscerated, I feel morally and intellectually
obligated simply to concede that the death penalty experiment has failed. 79
Blackmun issued his dissent, now widely quoted both as support for capital punishment
abolitionists and as fuel for the fire against judicial activists and living constitutionalists,
without a written opinion of the Court, an unusual step given the standard course of
Supreme Court proceedings. His basis for switching his position regarding the
constitutionality of the death penalty – the reason he voted to reinstate the death penalty
in 1976, and unabashedly to reject it in 1994 – was, as he indicates, moral and
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intellectual, and, as he suggests, arrived at with no undue turmoil of conscience. His
reasoning, and the dissent that proceeded from it, have sparked turmoils of conscience
within readers similar to the moral and intellectual struggle with which Blackmun issued
his dissent. Some have agreed with Blackmun wholeheartedly. Others have lost
themselves in the complicated morass of constitutional text and its moral implications, or
agreed with Blackmun’s conclusion, but not his method at arriving at it. And others, like
fellow Justice Antonin Scalia, have harshly berated Blackmun and his philosophy of
constitutional jurisprudence. Callins typifies the rift that exists between Blackmun and
Scalia, and those who think like them, in discerning the general “right and wrong” of
capital punishment in the American context, the punishment’s constitutional and moral
foundations, and the machinery of the state that carries out the death penalty in
contemporary society.
Unlike Blackmun, Scalia participates fully, and without reservation, in the
machinery of death. “My vote, when joined with four others, is, in most cases, the last
step that permits an execution to proceed,” he acknowledges in “God’s Justice and Ours,”
his preeminent defense of the death penalty as a Catholic.80 Paradoxically, however,
Scalia, like Blackmun, does not tinker with the machinery, though in a different sense.
Instead of attempting to clean his hands of the process, Scalia votes as a justice in a
manner that leaves the machinery to function just as it does. Scalia voted with the
majority in denying a review of Callins. Responding to Blackmun’s dissent in Callins,
Scalia issued a concurring opinion which states, “Convictions in opposition to the death
80
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penalty are often passionate and deeply held,” like Blackmun’s and the convictions of
many others. “That would be no excuse for reading them into a Constitution that does not
contain them, even if they represented the convictions of a majority of Americans. Much
less is there any excuse for using that course to thrust a minority's views upon the
people.”81 Blackmun’s conviction that “the death penalty experiment has failed” was,
according to Scalia, an entirely insufficient reason for voting as he did in Callins, given
Scalia’s Eighth Amendment interpretation of the constitutionality of the death penalty.
Scalia accuses Blackmun of imposing his belief regarding capital punishment on his
interpretation of a fixed, constitutional text. This, for Scalia, is perhaps the most capital of
arbitral sins a Supreme Court Justice can commit. In cases like Callins, Scalia, unlike
Blackmun, votes to uphold capital sentences when they are properly assigned based on
the constitutional merit of the death penalty. He expects other justices do the same,
leaving personal convictions out of their voting calculation. But Scalia also believes in
the moral underpinnings of capital punishment – his own passionate, deeply held
conviction – yet denies that he votes as he does because of it. Scalia votes to uphold death
sentences in cases like Callins because of their constitutionality. But within his vote, and
within his role as a justice, rests Scalia’s belief in the morality of capital punishment;
without it, he might have voted differently in Callins, or as he claims, not voted at all.
Scalia, simply put, is a Roman Catholic traditionalist. Not only does he have nine
children, but he attends one of the few parish churches in Washington D.C. that still
offers a Latin Mass, two minor examples of the traditional way in which Scalia lives his
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Catholic faith.82 It only follows logically, therefore, that Scalia adheres to what he terms
the “traditional” view on capital punishment as authored by the Church, a view which, in
his opinion, justifies his personal conviction regarding the death penalty, his career as a
justice in capital matters, and the way he votes in capital cases. Though Scalia votes
based on his interpretation of an “enduring” Constitution, he believes in the morality of
capital punishment, and without this belief, he claims he would leave the bench.83 “In my
view the choice for the judge who believes the death penalty to be immoral is resignation,
rather than simply ignoring duly enacted, constitutional laws and sabotaging death
penalty cases,” he explains, alluding to Blackmun and other like-minded jurists.84 For this
reason, Scalia stresses that his convictions, particularly those pertaining to the death
penalty, do not influence his vote, but do, regardless of influence, allow him to vote. And
given his understanding of Christian thought and traditional teaching of the Church
through time, Scalia maintains that he can support a conviction that does not find the
death penalty immoral (as he cautions from saying he “favors” capital punishment).85
Therefore, although Scalia denies any relationship of influence, the teaching of the
Church grounds the causality of his action and voting as a justice. Church teaching, in his
view, authorizes the death penalty; this teaching, because he is a Catholic, helps shape his
personal conviction regarding capital punishment; without this conviction, Scalia could
not sit on the Supreme Court; and without a seat on the Supreme Court, Scalia would not
hear cases like Callins, and could not vote on them as he does. But the first peg in
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Scalia’s structure - his understanding of Church teaching regarding capital punishment –
is somewhat flawed. St. Paul, Augustine, Aquinas, and other traditional Church voices do
not lend him the support he thinks they do, calling into question the stability of the causal
foundation of the vocational bench on which he sits and the position he so adamantly
maintains.
In his consideration of Church teaching regarding capital punishment in “God’s
Justice and Ours,” Scalia first references Paul’s words in Romans 13 as representative of
the establishment of God-given authority in government, and specifically, the moral
backing by which the state can carry out the death penalty. I’ve thoroughly discussed in
Chapter 2 the passage that Scalia references, the sharpest point of the selection being, “If
you do what is evil, be afraid; for [government] does not bear the sword without purpose;
it is the servant of God to inflict wrath on the evildoer,”86 or, in the King James Version,
the translation Scalia chooses, the state is “a minister of God, a revenger to execute
wrath” upon wrongdoers. 87 Regrettably, Scalia interprets the execution, revenge, and
wrath by the sword as “unmistakably a reference to the death penalty,”88 a common
mistake of literal translation against which Biblical scholar Dale Recinella fervently
warns, as previously discussed in Chapter 2. To review, the “sword” that Paul references,
in the original Greek, is machaira, a symbol of the power and authority of courts, but not
the rhomphaia used to behead offenders. Also, the “bring wrath” some translations use
and the “execute” Scalia prefers are words English translators artificially inserted into the
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passage, words that do not exist in the original Greek. Translators did not intend the
insertions to connote execution, but rather, the general responsibility of the state to
defend and protect society. 89 To Scalia’s credit, he selects this particular passage to
demonstrate how Paul separates individual morality from that of the larger state,90 which
is an accurate distinction, though much more complicated than Paul, Scalia, and for that
matter, Augustine understand (see my discussion of Donald Cabana, a former
executioner, in Chapter 6). The passage does not, however, support the governmental
morality of state executions that Scalia suggests, nor is it as representative of Church
teaching as he portrays. Paul does not provide the “consensus of Western thought” on
capital punishment that Scalia assumes, and Scalia mistakenly relies on his voice, among
others, as traditional Catholic consent for the machinery of death to operate.
Inherent in Scalia’s interpretation of Romans 13 is the understanding that
governmental authority has a responsibility to match crimes with an equivalent level of
punishment – quid pro quo, or an eye for an eye, as previously discussed via Aquinas in
Chapter 1. Scalia’s interpretation of Paul, therefore, and the understood assumption
therein, fits nicely within his larger theory behind capital punishment: that, at a
fundamental level, the death penalty, according to the tradition of the Church, is a
retributive measure. This theory, however, like Scalia’s interpretation of Paul, is
inaccurate. Scalia often says he prefers “the traditional view of Augustine and Aquinas”
pertaining to the death penalty, which, given the principle of quid pro quo, seems to
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bolster his personal conviction. 91 Like many, however, Scalia only reads Aquinas to say
“an eye for an eye,” an incomplete and fundamentally flawed reading. “Penalties imposed
in this life are corrective rather than retributive, for retribution is reserved to God’s
judgment,” Aquinas writes, as previously quoted, following his explanation of quid quo
pro.92 Though Aquinas acknowledged the need for the death penalty in the society in
which he lived – for crimes of irreparable harm, particularly perverted offenders, and
those wrongdoers from whom defense was impossible – he, like Augustine, emphasized
the corrective quality toward which punishment must aspire, rather than any retributive
character it should assume, as retribution belongs to God, and God alone, and not to
governmental authority. This is a message, however, that Scalia misses, whether
consciously or otherwise. Scalia seemingly skips over Augustine’s command to “avoid
the death penalty, so that there’s someone left to repent,” instead grabbing eagerly for the
sword of which he is an instrument.93 When Scalia reads Augustine and Aquinas, he
isolates instances in which they advocate for the death penalty in their particular societies
and interprets this advocacy as a call for retribution. In doing so, he misses the larger
context of correction in which they discuss punishment and justice.
Because Scalia misconstrues St. Paul, Augustine, Aquinas, and the tradition of the
Western Church as a case for retribution by way of the death penalty, it is no surprise he
strongly opposes John Paul II’s plea for correction over execution in Evangelium Vitae
and similarly themed (and sometimes identical) statements in the 1997 version of the
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Catholic catechism. Scalia takes particular issue with John Paul II’s mentioning of
defense in the following passage from the encyclical:
The nature and extent of punishment […] ought not to go to the extreme of
executing the offender except in cases of absolute necessity: in other
words, when it would not be possible otherwise to defend society. 94
By way of brief contextualization, John Paul II precedes this passage by noting that
society must impose “an adequate punishment for the crime” on capital offenders, and
concludes that given the evolved and improved nature of Western penal systems, cases in
which capital punishment is necessary are “very rare, if practically non-existent.”95 By
“adequate,” Scalia believes John Paul II means equal, or, in the case of the death penalty,
a death for a death – quid pro quo, or retributive, commutative justice. When John Paul II
then relies on the standard of defense, therefore, as the chief determinant of the societal
necessity of the death penalty, Scalia strongly objects, because, as he states, defense “has
no bearing whatever upon the adequacy of retribution. In fact, one might say that it has an
inverse bearing.”96 Given this interpretation, Scalia is absolutely correct. If retribution is
the primary purpose of the death penalty, than societal defense cannot be the standard by
which to evaluate the necessity of capital punishment. Scalia cites Timothy McVeigh,
who killed 168 people in the Oklahoma City bombing of 1995, as an example, one of the
more poignant examples in death penalty debates. Scalia acknowledges that society could
have locked McVeigh away forever, preventing another mass murder (though his
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perception of modern prisons is a bit skewed);97 but can life imprisonment ever justify the
168 people that died by McVeigh’s action? Examples like McVeigh’s certainly seem to
call for a punishment that matches the crime, retribution that Scalia eagerly assigns on
behalf of society. But retribution, as Augustine and Aquinas actually write, ultimately
belongs to God, and is not the primary purpose of capital punishment, nor a Church
theme lost in Evangelium Vitae, nor an accurate foundation on which Scalia can base his
capital jurisprudence as a Catholic.
If Scalia were to interpret John Paul II’s “adequate” as sufficient to protect
society, rather than equal, he might better take and understand John Paul II’s encyclical
and the corrective punishment he promotes. If the penal system can adequately protect
society from an offender to “preserv[e] the general good,” as Aquinas suggests, than
someone can be left to repent, as Augustine encourages, and the death penalty becomes a
very rare, if not practically nonexistent, means of punishment in society. This
interpretation lends to an enhanced understanding of “adequate” and a logical inclusion
of defense as a standard of evaluation. Because Scalia sees Evangelium Vitae as a
departure from the doctrine of retribution, however, rather than a continuation of the case
for correction, he mistakenly frames John Paul II’s argument in itself and the way in
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which it is framed in the larger context of Catholic social teaching on capital punishment.
“If just retribution is a legitimate purpose (indeed, the principal legitimate purpose) of
capital punishment,” Scalia poses at the conclusion of his discussion of Evangelium
Vitae, “can one possibly say with a straight face that nowadays death would ‘rarely if
ever be appropriate?’” 98 Hoping to lure his readers into the seemingly obvious “no,”
Scalia finishes his argument with the misdirection with which he began. The educated
Catholic reader, however, knows that correction, rather than retribution, is the principal
legitimate purpose of punishment, and has been since the time of Augustine and Aquinas.
And all readers, as sinful, imperfect humans, should be hesitant to accept the task of
judgment that Scalia offers, because if killing a murderer is the best recompense for
murder, God can issue judgment accordingly, and God alone.
Ultimately, Scalia decides that because Evangelium Vitae and the latest version
are not ex cathedra as discussed in Chapter 3, and because he has given them his
thoughtful consideration, his disagreement and preference for his understanding of the
Western consensus of the Church on capital punishment permit him to keep his job and
participate fully and willingly in the machinery of death. “It would be remarkable to
think,” he summarizes, “that a couple of paragraphs in an encyclical almost entirely
devoted not to crime and punishment but to abortion and euthanasia were intended
authoritatively to sweep aside (if one could) two thousand years of Christian teaching.”99
Scalia is correct once again on two fronts – first, John Paul II primarily addresses
abortion and euthanasia in Evangelium Vitae, issues that belong on a different moral
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plane in some respects than capital punishment, and second, it would be impossible to
sweep aside two thousand years of Church teaching in mere paragraphs – but misses two
corresponding points as well – first, like abortion and euthanasia, the death penalty
regulates the God-given (and God-alone-taketh) quality of human life, and second,
Evangelium Vitae’s paragraphs on capital punishment do not sweep away past teaching,
but confirm and integrate it in the present societal context. “Is it prudent,” Scalia later
asks, “to imperil acceptance of the Church’s hard teachings on birth control and abortion
and euthanasia […] by packaging them – under the wrapper ‘respect for life’ – with
another uncongenial doctrine that everyone knows does not represent the traditional
Christian view?”100 With respect for Justice Scalia, it might not be prudent to do as he
suggests, but the doctrine is actually quite congenial, and it does represent the traditional
Christian view, a view that fundamentally respects life with the other subjects of
“binding” teaching Scalia references, albeit Evangelium Vitae is not binding, at least to
him.
In The Death of Innocents, death penalty abolitionist Sr. Helen Prejean (whom I
discuss at length in Chapter 6) speaks out against Scalia’s vote in Callins and other
aspects of his jurisprudence in capital matters. “Justice Scalia and I couldn’t be further
apart,” she states plainly. “He provides the ‘legal groundwork’ to send people to their
deaths, and I resist his orders every way I can.”101 After witnessing Patrick Sonnier (and
four others) die in execution chambers after failing in appeals processes much like that of
Bruce Callins, Prejean discovered firsthand the tremendous power of decision contained
100
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within the American legal system. She also discovered Scalia, a fellow Catholic, her
brother Louie’s duck-hunting partner, and a participant in the machinery that sent her
incarcerated spiritual mentees to their deaths in execution chambers. Her critique of
Scalia covers some of the same points discussed previously, most notably Scalia’s
misinterpretation of Romans 13. She also admonishes Scalia’s indifference to the
humanity of individuals that ends in capital punishment, an indifference that Prejean
deems characteristic of machine-like behavior:
Not only does Justice Scalia judge behavior out of all context, he reads the
Constitution without acknowledging the influence of his own moral
values, and he quotes scripture without taking into account the historical
situations its authors were addressing. Such compartmentalized thinking is
the way machines work, not human beings.102
To Scalia’s credit, he is not a machine, but a human being, just like Prejean, and just like
all involved in capital matters. He is also a brilliant jurist and a steward of the U.S.
Constitution in a nation which needs true stewards. His fidelity to a literal and
historically-supported understanding of the Eighth Amendment is commendable, and in
many instances, preferable to broader readings that impose personal convictions on the
Constitution that do not match that of the people to which the document and its laws
ultimately belong. Scalia correctly identifies the proper medium of change in society’s
use of the death penalty as legislative, and not judicial. But his thinking, as Prejean
describes, is somewhat compartmentalized, and to extend the characterization, the
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compartments of Scalia’s mind are so separated that they are weakened by a lack of
integration, not to mention the compartments are erroneously constructed to some extent
in themselves. Though Scalia should not compromise his fidelity to the Constitution and,
as Prejean suggests, suddenly declare the death penalty unconstitutional and vote
accordingly, his belief in the morality of capital punishment as a Catholic deserves
review beyond the consideration and rejection of teaching he has given at present.
In “God’s Justice and Ours,” Scalia twice references Thomas More, patron saint
of lawyers, as an example of a Catholic who models his belief in the morality of capital
punishment through work as a jurist. First, Scalia quotes More’s final words to Cranmer,
More’s executioner in Robert Bolt’s A Man for All Seasons, a fictional account of More’s
death. Scalia believes More’s final words in Bolt’s play, his sentiment that “[God] will
not refuse one who is so blithe to go to Him,” effectively capture the traditional Western
conception of the death penalty as an outcome of free will. 103 Later, Scalia notes that
“one of the charges leveled by [More’s] detractors was that, as Lord Chancellor, he was
too quick to impose the death penalty.”104 More lived in a 16th century English society in
which capital punishment was necessary to remove harmful criminals from society. The
death penalty was also available for a much wider range of crimes – robbery, witchcraft,
even cutting down the wrong tree – for which the penalty can no longer be assessed
today. In refusing to swear to the Act of Succession, More died by the penalty, and his
life and martyrdom serve more as a powerful statement against capital punishment,
perhaps, than as evidence Scalia uses to promote it.
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Given Scalia’s argument for the death penalty, another section from Bolt’s play
seems particularly applicable to his discussion. When More’s family visits him for the
final time in prison, More’s daughter, Meg, attempts to persuade him to take Henry’s
oath, urging him to “say the words of the oath and in your heart think otherwise.”105 More
responds to his daughter and says, “When a man takes an oath, Meg, he’s holding his
own self in his own hands. Like water. And if he opens his hands then – he needn’t hope
to find himself again.”106 It seems that, somewhat like More, Justice Scalia holds an
oath, and himself, in each hand. One is to his country, to its Constitution, and the law and
people it serves. The other is to his Catholic faith, his Church, and ultimately, to his God.
Scalia endeavors to keep these oaths separate, though he acknowledges that the latter, his
oath to his faith, enables the former, his oath as a justice. As a father, husband, friend,
Catholic, and statesman, More had many oaths as well, but in the end, according to Bolt’s
play, he acknowledged an underlying commonality – love, and specifically, love for truth
– that prevails over all.
If Scalia’s oaths have a common denominator in his consideration of the death
penaly, which seems fleeting, if existent, it is most readily retribution, and not More’s
love for truth. In his mind, the Church teaches retribution, which becomes his personal
conviction in supporting the death penalty. He therefore sits on the Supreme Court, which
he views as the final step in the machine of capital retribution, and votes as he does in
capital matters in order to enact constitutionally acceptable retribution on wrongdoers
who deserve punishment. The Constitution, then, becomes Scalia’s secondary oath,
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though in the way Scalia arranges his argument in support of the death penalty, the
Constitution often appears as his first. What would happen, then, if Scalia were to find his
oaths in conflict with one another, or find that one of his oaths, most likely retribution, is
fallaciously informed? What might Scalia do if he woke up one morning and realized that
the message of the Church is not one of retribution, and that he can no longer support the
death penalty by personal conviction? What if, upon further reading of Augustine and
Aquinas, Scalia simply decided he was unsure as to whether or not capital punishment is
morally tenable? Any of these occurrences, according to Scalia, would result in his
resignation from the bench, the only way to keep his oath to the Constitution from
dripping out of his hands. Scalia could not sit on the bench and vote to uphold a
constitutionally mandated punishment when his conscience calls for its impracticability,
and would have no option but to step aside. And what a remarkable and unprecedented
act that would be (though not necessarily a suggestion of this exercise) if Scalia resigned
his seat, standing fast to his oaths to his Catholic faith and the Constitution and stepping
down from the highest court of human judgment, even at the risk of being a hero.107
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V
John Suthers and the Prosecution of Capital Offenders:
Seeking the Best Answer for Society’s Greatest Evils

After returning from tours of service in Vietnam, a group of GIs stationed at Fort
Carson, CO in the summer of 1975 formed a gang that burglarized various restaurants
and other merchants in the Colorado Springs area. Among other crimes, their primary
misdeed was robbery, but after agreeing together to murder anyone who stood in their
way or came to know of their actions, homicide became frequent as well. Over the gang’s
two-month crime campaign in the summer of 1975, the group killed at least five people.
Nineteen-year-old GIs Michael Corbett and Freddy Lee Glenn, two of the gang’s
members, were each responsible for awful, willful murders. Corbett stabbed a fellow
soldier with a bayonet when the soldier refused to give him a marijuana cigarette. At a
party following the killing, Corbett exhibited the bloody blade used to murder the soldier
and described to those present the satisfaction of plunging the knife into the soldier and
listening to his bones crack.108 One of Glenn’s victims was Karen Grammer, an eighteenyear-old waitress at a Red Lobster in Colorado Springs. When the gang of GIs arrived at
Grammer’s Red Lobster on July 1, 1975, and found it closed, the gang altered their
original plan of robbing the restaurant and abducted Grammer, taking her to a nearby
apartment where members of the gang alternated raping her. Afraid of what might happen
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if they released her, the gang decided to kill her, and Glenn stabbed her multiple times,
slit her throat, and left her for dead in an alley. Still alive, Grammer crawled fifty yards to
a nearby trailer park where she died attempting to reach one of the trailer’s doorbells. At
trial, juries convicted both Corbett and Glenn of first-degree murder and sentenced them
to death, but their sentences were changed to life imprisonment in 1978 when Colorado
overturned its death penalty statute.
As a law student intern at the 4th Judicial District Attorney’s Office in Colorado
Springs, CO in the summer of 1975, John Suthers researched various legal issues that
arose in Corbett and Glenn’s cases and attended much of their trial proceedings. “I had
never been exposed to such evil,” Suthers remembers in No Higher Calling, the book I
reference in this project’s introduction. “As a small part of the prosecution team, I felt the
immense satisfaction that prosecutors feel when they are successful in holding a
defendant responsible for a reprehensible crime.”109 This experience, among others, led to
Suthers’s career as a prosecutor. After completing law school, Suthers returned to the
Colorado Springs DA’s Office, where he spent the early part of his career and was later
elected as CO’s 4th Judicial District Attorney. From there, Suthers served four years as
the presidentially appointed U.S. Attorney for the State of Colorado, and currently
represents Colorado as the state’s Attorney General. Throughout his career, Suthers has
prosecuted many capital cases, and in numerous instances, has sought the death penalty.
He has encountered criminals whose evil actions have rivaled and even surpassed those
of Corbett and Glenn in the summer of 1975, and has found a life’s worth of meaning in
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demanding accountability for awful crimes on behalf of society as a prosecutor. Suthers
has dedicated his life to the prosecution of societal evil, and in some instances, the evil
has been of so great a magnitude that in his view, only the death penalty would suffice as
the desired prosecutorial outcome.
Though Suthers has become an accomplished prosecutor and public servant, he
was and is first a Roman Catholic. Raised and educated for sixteen years in Catholic
schools, the foundation of Suthers’s character resides in his Christian faith. One of his
guiding principles in life, “sic transit gloria mundi,” or “so passes the glory of the
world,” a phrase inscribed on a needlepoint that has hung in every office Suthers has ever
occupied, is an adage that his high school Latin teacher, a nun, first introduced to him.
This same nun encouraged him to pursue a career in public service to others, a significant
influence in Suthers’s eventual choice of vocation. Suthers’s Catholic upbringing is
evident also in the way in which he views the world and the law that regulates it.
Fundamentally, Suthers understands humans as inevitably sinful and self-interested
members of a society that tends toward chaos and anarchy if not regulated by a
communal social contract – the essential relationship Augustine posits in his City of God
and City of Man. This contract sets rules and regulations for a society in order to protect
it, and when these rules and regulations are violated, the community steps in to enforce
the contract, often by way of punishment. This, in Suthers’s opinion, is the principle role
of a prosecutor: to enforce a community’s social contract.110 During his time as a
prosecutor in Colorado Springs, Suthers assisted in founding the St. Thomas More
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Society, a group for Catholic lawyers in Colorado Springs who meet to discuss subjects
of faith and law. One set of group discussions explored the seven deadly sins – greed,
pride, lust, anger, envy, gluttony, and sloth – sins that Suthers has encountered repeatedly
in enforcing the societal contract of American communities. The death penalty, a
punishment that accompanies capital crimes often resulting from these cardinal sins,
surely arose as a controversial topic in the discussions of the More Society, and Suthers
undoubtedly defended his position in support of capital punishment, a position “in
opposition to the current view, although not the historical view, of the church
hierarchy.”111
Like Antonin Scalia, Suthers’s understanding of the historical view of the Church
hierarchy could use additional research, particularly in depth and breadth of reading and
understanding Thomas Aquinas, as he believes Aquinas provides historical precedent for
Catholic support of the death penalty. Suthers relies primarily upon Aquinas’s principle
of double effect, and the self-defense therein, as indicative of historical Church teaching
regarding the death penalty. While Suthers correctly identifies Aquinas’s double effect as
one of the most important, if not the most important, contributions to Catholic social
teaching on the death penalty throughout history, and even today, he mistakenly isolates
it as Aquinas’s chief statement on the subject and fails to contextualize double effect in
the larger scope of Church voices and statements on capital punishment. In the previous
chapter, I pointed out Scalia’s misinterpretation of Aquinas’s central message regarding
punishment as one of retribution, rather than correction, that Aquinas, like Augustine,
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actually intends. This clarification applies to Suthers as well. Suthers, however, though he
explicitly states that “the punishment must fit the crime” prior to his discussion of double
effect, does not see Church doctrine as retributive to the extent Scalia does, though he
defends retribution as an acceptable intent of punishment.112 He believes retribution seeks
necessary accountability for societal crime, and can exist without vengeance as
motivation. Suthers combines what he understands as the Church’s response to capital
crimes – self-defense and retribution – with what he believes to be the only adequate
response from society to murders like that of Karen Grammer – the death penalty.
Suthers supports capital punishment in society because, as a prosecutor, he has seen the
power of the death penalty and the tightening effect it has on public safety. He has looked
individuals like Michael Corbett and Freddy Lee Glenn in the eye, has seen firsthand the
evil of their actions, and has worked as a prosecutor to restore the societal contract and
preserve and protect life to the best of his ability, needing and using the death penalty in
order to do so. And though he could gain a wider understanding of Aquinas in the context
of the Church’s message of mercy and correction, his experience testifies to the
horrendous crime and evil in society that require an appropriate punishment and answer
for society.
Although Suthers respects the rationale behind life imprisonment, he continues to
support capital punishment in society in a very limited capacity for crimes that require the
highest retributive societal response and for individuals who present an uncontainable
risk of harm to society. When defending his position in support of the death penalty,
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Suthers frequently cites numerous instances he has encountered as a prosecutor where
prison inmates have murdered fellow inmates and correctional officials while serving life
sentences.113 These examples, in his opinion, along with those of individuals like Michael
Corbett and Freddy Lee Glenn, belong in the category of rare, practically non-existent
cases that Pope John Paul II identifies in Evangelium Vitae for which the death penalty is
still morally viable. Not only does the increased security of death row deny the possibility
of additional murder in the future, but the death penalty alone can satisfy the societal
need for a response to an inmate’s action of homicide while in prison. Without recourse
to capital punishment, adding years to an inmate sentenced to life imprisonment hardly
punishes an inmate’s wrongdoing or holds the inmate responsible for ending a life. “Life
imprisonment is simply inadequate in these types of circumstances,” Suthers urged to me
in a personal interview. “Something must be done to enforce accountability on behalf of
society, and capital punishment alone carries enough weight to enforce the [societal]
contract.”114 The evil present in the case of an inmate killing another inmate or a prison
guard is undeniable, and raises one of the most difficult scenarios in discerning the
practical morality of capital punishment in contemporary society. What is to be done to
punish an inmate who ends the life of another while serving a life sentence in prison? Is
moving the inmate to a higher security prison enough of a response, or is the retributive
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measure of capital punishment a viable, or even necessary, option? Suthers argues
fervently for the latter, as the death penalty is, in his opinion, the only answer for this
type of wrongdoing.
When I asked in our conversation what role rehabilitation and redemption play in
the fate of capital offenders, particularly for those who kill and then kill again in prison,
Suthers responded that those who face the death penalty have every opportunity to repent.
“Those facing capital execution for a terrible affront to society have the opportunity to
repent for their actions and make amends to God. Death row is not devoid of redemptive
ingredients,” he said, calling attention to spiritual advisors like Sr. Helen Prejean and the
time and services available to those sentenced to death.115 In Suthers’s view, an inmate’s
time on death row combines a necessary retributive measure on behalf of society with an
opportunity for an offender’s correction and renewal. For this reason, Suthers does not
find that his support for the death penalty as a prosecutor compromises the beliefs he
holds as a Catholic, though he acknowledges his position places him in some contrast to
that of the Church. Tragic cases of inmates murdering each other or guards, gangs of
soldiers gathering together and planning group homicides, and other heinous evils present
in society require the death penalty, Suthers maintains, the only measure by which
society can match crimes with the proper punishment, and the primary way, given his
understanding of Thomistic self-defense, by which Suthers integrates his convictions
regarding societal justice with those he holds as a Catholic. These tragic cases do not
prevent the good that can come from an offender’s rehabilitation process, but in some
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ways, according to Suthers, promote what can come from reconciliation. In Suthers’s
view, capital punishment satisfies the highest standard of justice society can afford, a
standard that he accepts as a Catholic and pursues as a prosecutor.
Though Suthers makes a compelling case for capital punishment as a viable and
necessary standard of justice in society, the question remains as to whether a better
standard exists, one that more readily meshes with his Catholic faith. In our discussion of
rehabilitation, Suthers brought up the concept of restorative justice, the idea that by some
action, offenders and the legal and penal systems can work together to repair or redeem
crimes committed against society. “I don’t really believe in much of what restorative
justice promises,” Suthers explained, pointing to the example of a victim of rape sitting
down with the rapist in an attempt at mutual reconciliation, or the family of a murder
victim sitting down with the murderer with a similar intended goal of restoration. “I just
don’t think anyone is going to really want to talk in that type of situation, and I don’t
think much can come from it,” he remarked.116 This conclusion fits logically with
Suthers’s belief in the merit of retribution, as a taken life can never be fully restored,
while one can be taken in return to match the life lost. Suthers is correct that forgiveness
is an incredibly high standard of justice, particularly when forced through the arranged
examples he gives. But forgiveness is not impossible, and the stories of Helen Prejean,
Patrick Sonnier, Donald Cabana, Antoinette Bosco, and all those discussed in Chapter 6
show that while a life taken in a murder can never be restored to what it was, much can
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be accomplished by, as Augustine states, “[leaving] someone to learn the lesson.”117
Restorative justice does not negate the need for punishment, nor does it do away with the
societal requirement for an answer to wrongdoing for which Suthers so strongly
advocates. Instead, restorative justice combines corrective elements for a wrongdoer with
Suthers’s vengeance-free version of retribution through punishment, a middle ground that
Suthers should reconsider.
As I finished my interview with Suthers, he stressed that he is a well-read and
faithful Catholic. “I went to Catholic schools for sixteen years,” he reminded me. “I read
my catechism dutifully and kept up with all that the Church taught. No one ever told me
that the death penalty was wrong.”118 As Suthers is well aware, the Church has, until very
recently, acknowledged the death penalty as a necessary practice to defend society from
individuals intent on causing harm. He is also aware, however, that the same teaching, on
the surface, is changing. In No Higher Calling, he concludes his discussion of capital
punishment with the following:
I’ll continue to examine my conscience concerning the issue, but I suspect
I’ll continue to view death as an appropriate punishment in a narrow class
of particularly heinous murders that combine obvious premeditation and
overwhelming evidence of guilt and for which any other penalty seems to
me to be an inadequate societal response. 119
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It is encouraging that Suthers will continue to weigh the morality of capital punishment
as a Catholic and prosecutor. He might start, as suggested previously, with a wider
reading of Aquinas and Augustine to expand his understanding of the historical view of
the Church hierarchy, which, though it may appear to be changing, authors a message of
correction that remains consistent in that of the present Magisterium, albeit calling for a
different outcome in life than previously sanctioned state executions. Suthers points to
some of society’s most tragic and difficult cases of violence as circumstances in which
the death penalty remains necessary and falls outside of the scope of society’s ability to
defend and protect. As a prosecutor and guardian of society, he knows these cases better
than anyone. If he is correct in that the death penalty is a necessary answer, his Catholic
faith still calls for rehabilitation of all offenders to the greatest extent possible,
rehabilitation that might exist more successfully outside of death row.
These points aside, Suthers has proven his commitment to enforcing society’s
code throughout his career as a prosecutor, and has done so in a way that has engaged his
Catholic faith, rather than artificially separating it from his vocation. He, like Antonin
Scalia, is a faithful steward of the Constitution and understands the intended design of
American society and the necessary mode of altering it. “If I had felt differently about
capital punishment at the start of or at any point during my career, I couldn’t have been a
prosecutor,” Suthers promised me, indicating he would, like Scalia, step down from his
position if his personal conviction regarding the death penalty changed, rather than force
his conviction on society.120 Keeping with Scalia and Suthers’s shared affinity for
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Thomas More, Suthers, a Catholic jurist with a strong commitment to the oaths of his life,
may be the closest individual that Colorado (if not the United States) has to a
contemporary Thomas More – a Catholic prosecutor for all seasons. As Suthers’s career
experience shows, “we see that avarice, anger, envy, pride, sloth, lust, and stupidity
commonly profit [today] far beyond humility, chastity, fortitude, justice and thought, and
we have to choose, to be human at all,” some of More’s final words to Meg during their
last meeting in Bolt’s A Man for All Seasons.121 Our society and its legal system need
men like John Suthers, men who choose to be human, even when this choice, like the
public service to which he has dedicated his life, is less than profitable. We need Suthers
to continue to examine his conscience in order to find the best societal answer for the
greatest evils of our time, balancing his experience with an informed sense of morality
and faith. Additionally, we need to join him in the truest efforts of corrective and
restorative justice, considering how we must choose to be human in the action and
conduct of our lives.
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VI
Living on the Ground with Helen Prejean:
Facing the Realities of American Capital Punishment

I first met Sr. Helen Prejean in April 2009 at a talk she gave at Naropa University
in Boulder, CO. When I arrived at Naropa before the talk, I saw Prejean finish a
conversation with a Naropa student and head to the bathroom before taking her spot on a
stage in a lecture hall. Alhough a somewhat inconsiderate move on my part, I stopped her
before she reached the bathroom, thinking it might be my only chance to request a
personal interview at a later date. I told her who I was, that I was studying at Regis
University, and that I was writing a thesis on Catholic social teaching and capital
punishment. Though I’m sure she wished she could have just gone to the bathroom in
peace to gather her thoughts before speaking, she agreed to a personal interview at a later
date, smiling at me with a certain gleam in her eye – a gleam for the Jesuits, I thought, or
perhaps recognition of Regis, where she has spoken before. As I’ve since interviewed
Prejean and studied her writing and work as a death penalty activist and abolitionist, I
now understand the gleam in her eye was one of hope for what I might come to learn
through the process, and hope that my work might influence others, particularly Catholic
others, to inform their consciences regarding the practice of capital punishment in
contemporary American society. It is a tremendous statement to Prejean’s character that,
given her rigorous travel schedule and work load, she volunteered her time to speak with
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me, a lowly undergraduate dipping my toes in the oceanic study that is the topic of this
exercise. The same can be said of John Suthers, who in our conversation acknowledged
Prejean as someone who “has lived what she talks about and actually knows the
intricacies of our American legal system and the death penalty debate,” high praise from
someone with an opposing view on the subject.122 Prejean “lives on the ground,” as she
often states, to fight what she views as one of the greatest moral problems of
contemporary American society.123 Her story is one of true gumption, and it meets and
surpasses Suthers’ praise.
Prejean grew up witnessing many of the evils she would combat as a consecrated
woman. “Daddy, an attorney, represented a slew of black clients, charging them five
dollars for his services,” she remembers from her childhood, pointing to her father’s pro
bono offerings as one of her first inspirations to stand up for the poor, discriminated, and
marginalized. “It would take me a long time to understand how systems inflict pain and
hardship in people’s lives and to learn being kind in an unjust system is not enough.”124
This realization, one that called her to a vocation of action, is one of the first she makes in
Dead Man Walking: An Eyewitness Account of the Death Penalty in the United States,
now a landmark work in the study of capital punishment and a major motion picture. In
Dead Man Walking, Prejean chronicles her journey in accompanying two men, Elmo
Patrick Sonnier and Robert Lee Willie, to the execution chamber after both were
convicted of capital homicide. As each man’s spiritual advisor during his time on death
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row, Prejean discovered pain, hardship, and other injustices present in the American legal
system. She continued this process in advising three additional men during their time on
death row, two of whom were Dobie Williams and Joseph O’Dell, whose stories she
relates in The Death of Innocents, her second book. As the title suggests, Prejean strongly
believed both Williams and O’Dell were innocent of the murders for which they were
convicted and executed for crimes that they did not commit. Prejean now travels the
globe, speaking, advocating, and acting in various capacities against the practice of the
death penalty, particularly in the United States. For the adversity she observed in the
situations of Patrick Sonnier and Robert Willie, the legal failure she believes occurred in
the cases of Dobie Williams and Joe O’Dell, and various other reasons, Prejean calls for
an end to capital punishment, acting daily on her Catholic conviction to preserve life,
regardless of circumstance.
When I asked Prejean for a consolidated, comprehensive explanation of the basic
reasons for her disagreement with the practice of the death penalty, she pointed me back
to the 2005 statement from the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops regarding
capital punishment, a document I referenced in Chapter 3. The statement, entitled “A
Culture of Life and the Penalty of Death,” lists the following four reasons for which the
United States should no longer exercise the death penalty:
•

The sanction of death, when it is not necessary to protect society, violates
respect for human life and dignity.

•

State-sanctioned killing in our names diminishes all of us.
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•

Its application is deeply flawed and can be irreversibly wrong, is prone to
errors, and is biased by factors such as race, the quality of legal
representation, and where the crime was committed.

•

We have other ways to punish criminals and protect society. 125

The Bishops’ statement, which centers on these four points, calls ultimately for “common
action to end the use of the death penalty, to reject a culture of death, and to build a
culture of life.”126 It encompasses the loss of life Prejean has witnessed in execution
chambers, the mistakes and wrongful executions she has discovered in her time with
death row inmates, the hard-heartedness and indecency of government officials,
corrections officials, and other operators of the machinery of death with whom she has
interacted, and a line of thought that directly mirrors Pope John Paul II’s statements in
Evangelium Vitae and the most recent version of the Catholic Catechism. “The Church
doesn’t need another statement besides [the USCCB’s],” Prejean told me when I asked if
the Catholic Church needs to issue a more binding or inclusive doctrine on the subject of
capital punishment. “We need action,” she continued, “and we need education.”127 Given
her experiences, Prejean has seen what Catholics and the rest of the American population
need to know about capital punishment. She has lived in solidarity with the evils she
identifies as present in the American practice of capital punishment, and now writes and
speaks of these evils in the hope that action will be taken to do away with them.
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In accompanying five men to death row, Prejean has interacted with the multitude
of individuals who stand in and along the road to an execution chamber. This multitude
includes death row inmates themselves, Supreme Court Justices and other jurists, state
governors, district attorneys, public defenders, and other attorneys, family and friends of
victims of capital murders, family and friends of capital murderers, wardens,
executioners, and all those who work in corrections and the penal system, social workers,
politicians, lobbyists, priests and other clergy, the media, and other interested persons.
This multitude, many of whom, in Prejean’s experience, were of a Christian disposition,
if not Catholic, faces the same challenge Antonin Scalia, John Suthers, Prejean, and all
those involved in legal matters engage: the integration of personal faith and morality with
the duties and action vocation. For some, this integration permits the death penalty, or
even demands it. For others, this integration results in a position in opposition to capital
punishment, or an irreconcilable conflict of conscience that ends in the abandonment of a
career. And still others, like Prejean, find inspiration in this integration to act against the
death penalty, taking on a new role and vocation to advocate for change and reform. The
individuals that line the road to a death chamber, though their positions on capital
punishment may differ, together illustrate the breadth of choices that Catholics and other
Christians make when confronted with the difficult moral questions of the death penalty.
As Prejean demonstrates, these choices, when coupled with the actions that result from
them, often carry the weight of life and death.
Elmo Patrick Sonnier was the first man Prejean accompanied to an execution
chamber. Adapted in part as Michael Poncelet (Sean Penn) in Dead Man Walking’s film,
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Sonnier’s story and death sparked Prejean’s career and present work as a death penalty
abolitionist. In the early hours of the morning on November 5, 1977, Sonnier and his
brother, Eddie, abducted Loretta Bourque and David LeBlanc, two teenagers from New
Iberia, Louisiana. In a remote Iberia oilfield, the brothers handcuffed LeBlanc to a tree,
Sonnier raped Bourque, and Bourque then agreed to consensual intercourse with Eddie
when the brothers promised to release the couple safely if she agreed. Fearing the couple
would report the brothers’ actions to authorities upon release, and that this report would
result in Sonnier’s return to the Louisiana State Penitentiary, where he had previously
served time, the brothers decided to kill the couple. The next morning, Louisiana
authorities found the couple face-down in the Iberia oilfield, each dead after being shot
three times in the back of the head at close range with a .22-caliber rifle. Initially, after
mutually accusing each other at trial, Louisiana juries convicted both brothers of firstdegree murder and sentenced them to death, but upon review, a Louisiana appellate court
reversed both convictions and sentencings. Eddie’s retrial resulted in a sentence of life
imprisonment without parole, and at Sonnier’s retrial, Eddie, now without the fear of
death, recanted his initial accusation that Sonnier shot the couple and took responsibility
for the killings himself. Sonnier later confirmed this version of the incident in private
conference with Prejean during his time on death row. It appears that Eddie changed his
account of the incident numerous times in an effort to avoid a death sentence, and
Louisiana prosecutors successfully impeached his testimony at Sonnier’s second trial.
Though Eddie avoided death at retrial, Sonnier was not so fortunate, and received another
conviction for first-degree murder and the death sentence that accompanied it. Despite
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various appeals and petitions, Sonnier’s conviction stood. The state of Louisiana
executed him by electrocution on April 5, 1984.
Advising Sonnier during his time on death row not only revealed to Prejean a case
in which the government executed an individual for a crime he may not have committed,
but Prejean’s relationship with Sonnier also opened her eyes to other failures of the
American legal system and the brutal inhumanity of capital executions. Put simply,
Sonnier hardly met the expectations Prejean had before meeting him, and for that matter,
whatever expectations the average American likely entertains for a capital murderer.
When Prejean first arrived at the penitentiary to meet with Sonnier, a convicted rapist and
murderer, he presented her with a picture frame he created in his cell with empty cigarette
packages, a gift from a man she quickly found to be quite the opposite of the evil and
malevolent villain that the media and reports of his crime had construed him to be. In
talking with Sonnier, Prejean quickly discovered the badly blurred truth of fact in
Sonnier’s trials, and the poor and inadequate state-appointed legal counsel who had
represented him throughout the proceedings. Had Sonnier received the time and attention
initially of a competent defense attorney (as in Millard Farmer, the attorney who would
try to save his life in his final days), the wide discrepancies in accounts of his crime may
have been exposed, and he may have avoided the electric chair. To Prejean, Sonnier was
a troubled, underprivileged man who felt extreme sorrow for the wrongful actions of his
life and deeply regretted all that had brought him to death row. When asked by the
executioner if he had any last words, Sonnier turned to Lloyd LeBlanc, David’s father, a
man intent on seeing Sonnier executed, and said, “Mr. LeBlanc, I don’t want to leave this
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world with any hatred in my heart. I want to ask your forgiveness for what me and Eddie
done, but Eddie done it.”128 Sonnier understood what he had done, and was sorry for his
action. He was also fully aware of various injustices and irreconcilable aspects of the
entire ordeal, an awareness that likely contributed to his decision not to apologize to
Godfrey Bourque, Loretta’s father, also intent on Sonnier’s execution, who sat with
Lloyd LeBlanc during the execution. Sonnier’s last words highlight the immense
difficulty of forgiveness that capital cases present, another of Prejean’s discoveries in the
process. Prejean listened to Sonnier’s last words, held his hand seconds before his death,
and watched him die. Shortly after departing from the penitentiary after the execution,
Prejean’s car pulled over to side of the road, she leaned out a door, and vomited, a
physical manifestation of the moral nausea that Patrick Sonnier’s death brought her.
Although Patrick Sonnier died on April 5, 1984, he came alive again in various
capacities in Prejean’s interaction with the other men she has accompanied to the death
chamber. Six months after Sonnier’s execution, Prejean began writing to Robert Lee
Willie, whom Louisiana executed on December 28, 1984, for the kidnapping, raping, and
murdering of eighteen-year-old Faith Hathaway. In serving as Willie’s spiritual advisor,
she found another indigent man convicted of and sentenced for a terrible crime without
proper legal counsel, developed a relationship with a disturbed, but penitent, inmate, and
watched him die. From July 24, 1996, to July 23, 1997, Prejean repeated the same cycle
with Joseph O’Dell, the convicted murderer, rapist, and sodomist of forty-four-year-old
Helen Schartner. Overzealous Virginia prosecutors, a jailhouse informant, and again,
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inadequate defense counsel, doomed O’Dell. With the help of Prejean and Lori Urs, a
prison ministry volunteer who believed in O’Dell’s innocence and married him in prison
only days before his death, O’Dell disputed his conviction to the very end. His story and
its controversy contributed to the 1997 changes in the Catholic catechism as discussed in
Chapter 2. On January 8, 1999, Prejean witnessed Dobie Williams’s execution. Mentally
disadvantaged, incredibly poor, and facing racial discrimination as an African-American,
Williams also met an unforgiving justice system when convicted of stabbing and killing
Sonja Knippers, a forty-three-year-old woman from Louisiana, another case in which
questions remain as to the convicted’s guilt. Like O’Dell, Williams denied his conviction
as a murderer until his execution, but to no avail. “I just want to say I got no hard feelings
for anybody. God bless everybody,” Williams said in the spirit of forgiveness as he
stepped into the execution chamber’s gurney to receive his lethal injection.129 Given all
that Prejean experienced with Williams and the other men she has accompanied to death
row, the message at the core of her work emerges in the underlying theme of Williams’
last words: mercy, and the option for reconciliation. But where Prejean found mercy in
the hearts of death row inmates, she struggled to find it in many of the other individuals
she encountered on the road to execution chambers. These individuals often separated
themselves from the reality of capital punishment, complying with their expected duties
and responsibilities while suppressing their personal beliefs and faith, whether merciful
or otherwise.
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When the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals refused to overturn Patrick Sonnier’s
second death sentence, Prejean met with then-Louisiana Governor Edwin Edwards in the
hope that Edwards would either commute Sonnier’s sentence or sway the state Pardon
Board toward clemency. As governor, Edwards had the ability to commute sentences as
he deemed necessary and prevent criminals from facing the death penalty, a privilege
many governors still hold today. On March 27, 1984, a week before Sonnier’s execution,
Edwards publicly refused to commute Sonnier’s sentence at a televised meeting with
Prejean and others who sought mercy for Sonnier. “‘I’m the governor and represent the
state and must carry out the laws and must submerge my own personal views to carry out
the expressed will of the people,’” Edwards explained at the meeting, cleaning his hands
of Sonnier’s end. 130 Edwards was Louisiana’s first Catholic governor in the twentieth
century, and presided over fifteen state executions during his four terms in office.
“Edwards trie[d] to put the death process as far from himself as possible,” Prejean recalls
from conversations with Edwards, in regard both to Sonnier’s case and other executions.
“Still, he [couldn’t] escape the red telephone in the corner of the death chamber, where a
call from him, even at the last minute, [would mean] life for the man being strapped in
the chair and silence means death.”131 Edwards chose, fifteen times over, to remain silent,
subordinating his personal belief regarding capital punishment, whatever it might have
been, to the will of the Louisiana people and the death penalty they supported during his
time in office. He often encouraged those who opposed the death penalty to raise
legislation to abolish it, a suggestion he made to Prejean and those present at the meeting
130
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on March 27. In 16 years as Louisiana’s governor, Edwards never made an affirmative
action to execute a criminal. He did, however, make fifteen choices, and fifteen times, he
chose to allow the machinery of death to operate as it would.
Sixteen years following Prejean and Edwards’s meeting, then-Illinois Governor
George Ryan, a Methodist, declared a state-wide moratorium on the death penalty in
January 2000. Three years later, on January 11, 2003, Ryan commuted the death
sentences of the 167 convicts on Illinois’s death row at the time, changing their
sentencing agreements to life imprisonment as appropriate. “I don’t know if we’ll ever go
back to the death penalty as we knew it, as long as I’m governor,” Ryan stated, opting for
what he saw as the only guaranteed solution to prevent the conviction and execution of a
rapidly growing number of innocent individuals convicted of capital crimes in the
state.132 “He blamed rogue cops, zealous prosecutors, incompetent defense lawyers, and
judges who rule on technicalities rather on what is right” as the basis for the moratorium,
Prejean explains in Death of Innocents.133 Ryan picked up the red telephone at the end of
execution chambers throughout the state and, unlike Edwards, chose not to remain silent.
He saw a flawed and broken system of capital justice in Illinois, and moved to fix it given
the power of his office as governor. As a Republican and consistent political supporter of
the death penalty, Ryan drew significant criticism for his decision. Many questioned the
motive behind his decision, and some suspected he declared the moratorium to resurrect
his public image given ongoing corruption investigations and other scandals during his
132
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time in office. Others criticized him for abusing the power vested in him as governor.
Regardless of motive, Ryan acted as he did because he saw a problem with the death
penalty and commutation as the solution to it, and by acting, revived the longstanding
national debate on the morality of capital punishment. His action was one of personal
conviction and belief, a difficult choice that elicited the expected response of controversy
and saved the lives of 167 Illinois convicts.
In considering Ryan’s mass commutation, Prejean predictably praises his action,
while detailing her disagreement and disappointment with Governor Edwards. “Politics
plays its part,” Prejean concludes in her analysis of Edwards’s decision. “Dare [a
governor] risk his political career to save the lives of a few condemned criminals? What’s
a governor to do?” she asks. 134 “Every human being must take a stand when discerning
the morality of capital punishment,” she told me in our interview. “Some will choose
based on politics, others on justice. But everyone must separate what they need to do
from what they want to do.”135 Edwards and Ryan both took a stand as governor.
Edwards placed his personal feelings on the death penalty aside, or refused to admit
them, in order to rule as expected. His choice was one of politics and, though it
complicates Prejean’s posed dichotomy, one he felt was just. His Catholic faith, however,
was an afterthought. The difficulty he experienced in separating the needs and wants of
his choice and the turmoil of conscience therein are quite evident given Prejean’s
interaction with him as he deliberated over Sonnier’s fate. Conversely, Ryan’s choice,
though quite the opposite and rooted in impassioned personal conviction, was also one of
134
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politics, and one he felt was just. Of the 167 individuals pardoned, some were indeed
innocent of the capital crimes for which they were sentenced, and others still guilty. For
this reason and others, many criticized him for an exercise of power that stepped outside
of the voting will of the people of Illinois, its courts, and its juries. Prejean applauds
Ryan’s action as governor, but despite the lives saved, questions remain as to the personal
motivation behind his action and the means of arriving at it. So, what, then, is the best
course of executive action for a governor given the situations Edwards and Ryan faced,
particularly a governor of a Catholic or Christian disposition? Is it possible to separate
needs and wants in decision making given the will of the people and the power of a
gubernatorial office? As governors, Edwards and Ryan attempted to walk lines that
separate just pardoning and judicial policymaking, personal faith and the will of the
people, and quite literally, life and death. Their choices mark the path of their walk, a
path that, given the Christian understanding of their faith traditions, assumes the powers
of mercy and condemnation that ultimately belong to God, powers that perhaps exceed
the scope of a gubernatorial office.
Shortly before Patrick Sonnier’s execution, Prejean spoke with Paul C. Phelps, the
head of the Louisiana Department of Corrections at the time and supervisor of
executions, a “‘good, Catholic man’” with the ability to exercise powers of mercy and
condemnation, to discuss Sonnier’s fate and her objections to the execution process.136
Phelps listened intently, explained that all would go on as planned, and arranged for
Prejean to attend Sonnier’s execution. He promised her he would “‘make sure that [the]
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event [was] carried out with as much dignity and respect as possible,’” and when the day
of Sonnier’s execution came, he calmly and willingly fulfilled his promise.137 After the
execution, Prejean met again with Phelps, remembering that his “cool, professional tone
had terrified [her],” a man far too comfortable with the duties of one who supervises
executions.138 When she asked Phelps what he believed executions accomplished, he
replied, “‘Nothing,’” detailing his view that the death penalty is not an effective deterrent
and concluding that “By its nature the criminal justice system will always be somewhat
arbitrary.’”139 Prejean challenged these responses, asking how Phelps reconciled his
duties as a supervisor of executions with personally held beliefs that seemingly opposed
the expectations of his job. “Do you experience any conflict of conscience between your
personal religious beliefs and what your job calls you to do?” she questioned.140 Phelps
responded, in language reminiscent of Governor Edwards, that the law was not his, and
he had no choice but to follow it, maintaining that he had no “personal responsibility” in
the process.141 He then clarified, like Antonin Scalia and John Suthers, that if he morally
opposed any part of his job, he would resign, and would have refused to take the job
initially. When Prejean asked if he would ever consider attending one of the executions
he supervised, he said, quite plainly, that he never would – an odd choice, she thought,
for a supervisor to so adamantly separate himself from that which he supervises. Their
interaction ended in this type of oddity and paradox. “‘From a personal standpoint it is
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very, very bizarre to design a process like this,’” Phelps explained to Prejean.142 But,
despite all reservations, Phelps designed and supervised executions, separating personal
belief and public duty in a way Prejean never understood and forever rejected.
In Death of Innocents, Prejean praises the work of Donald Cabana, a man quite
similar to Phelps in title and career, but quite dissimilar in the practice of his vocation.
Cabana, a devout Catholic, spent twenty-five years in prison work, during which he gave
orders to execute two men during his time as the prison warden at the Mississippi State
Penitentiary in Parchman, MS. One of the men, Connie Ray Evans, catalyzed in Cabana a
powerful execution room epiphany reminiscent of Prejean’s encounter with Patrick
Sonnier and her other spiritual mentees. Cabana gives an account of Connie’s final
minutes in Death at Midnight: The Confession of an Executioner, detailing both his work
as an executioner and the experiences that brought him to oppose the societal practice of
capital punishment. After the prison chaplain led the execution chamber in the Lord’s
Prayer in the moments leading up to Connie’s execution, Connie turned to Cabana and
left the following indelible mark on his conscience:
As we shook hands, Connie thanked me for the many kindnesses extended
to him by the staff. Then, with a sheepish laugh, he asked if the warden
would be embarrassed if an inmate hugged him. Searching fruitlessly for
comforting words, we silently embraced for a long moment.143
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After their embrace, Cabana felt compelled to comfort the man whose life he was
prepared to end. “Connie spoke quietly […] He wanted to whisper his final words to me,”
Cabana recalls. “He thanked me for being his friend. I started to speak, but he asked me
to wait, and then told me softly, ‘From one Christian to another, I love you.’ I wanted to
respond, but no words would come. Now I was the one in shock, shaken to my very
soul.”144 Connie found forgiveness and thanksgiving in his final moments of life. He
transformed the retribution cited as cause for his execution, returning the hardship of his
time on death row with love for his executioners. Cabana hardly knew what to do, or how
to respond. Connie’s love for him redefined the intersection of his work as an executioner
with the beliefs of his Catholic faith, and Cabana was never the same.
Connie’s execution, as indicated, shook Cabana’s very soul. It questioned the
justice he once found in the death penalty, and challenged him to reconsider the
punishment of death he had previously held as a societally necessary measure of
retribution. “If Connie Ray Evans was some awful monster deemed worthy of
extermination, why did I feel so bad about it?” he remembers thinking. “As I watched a
grieving mother leave her son for the last time,” reflecting on Connie’s final goodbye to
his mother, “I questioned how the sordid business of executions was supposed to be the
great equalizer.”145 Cabana stepped outside of what Phelps defined as the “proper role of
an executioner,” allowing his personal feelings and emotions from the experience to
compromise the expectations of his office. It took years for him to settle the turmoil
Connie raised in his conscience. Cabana never stepped down from his position as warden,
144
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as Phelps promised Prejean he would have had he experienced the transformation Cabana
did. Instead, he continued along in his work. “Each new day’s crises kept me from having
to think or remember. But nothing could dispel the feelings I harbored inside. Try as I
did, I could not remove the lingering doubt or bewilderment,” Cabana confesses.146 When
he wrote about his experience with Connie and as a warden years later, it was only then
that he could muster the courage to reveal his true sentiment: that he had done wrong as
an executioner, he felt tremendous guilt for his action, and he had no option in moving
forward but to call for the abolishment of capital punishment and save not only the lives
of sentenced murderers, but the lives of executioners committed to carrying out the
supposed justice of the state without any consideration for their own convictions. He
concludes his book with the following prescription:
This is not a particularly good time in which to find myself an opponent of
capital punishment. Paradoxically, however, […] it may also be the best of
times. Never has there been a greater need for rationality and clear
thinking. Absent the emotionalism and histrionics that have always been
so characteristic of the debate, the present offers greater opportunity then
ever for pragmatism and calm deliberation. There is much need, and room,
for both.147
Given Cabana’s career choice, he never found a particularly good time to oppose capital
punishment, but as he suggests, he found plenty of opportunities. His call for an
intentional, thorough, and critical review of the practice of capital punishment in
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contemporary society is as necessary today as when he authored his book, particularly for
executioners and those directly involved in carrying out the death penalty. And finally,
there is much need, and much room, for not only pragmatism and calm deliberation, but
for action as well, as Prejean’s work suggests. It is time for those involved in capital
matters to take into account what they personally believe and act upon it in responsible
and appropriate ways, like Cabana, rather than hide behind a cloak of duty without
thought and acquiesce to the present system of punishment in passivity.
Prejean, obviously, is one who has accepted this challenge, but not without
difficulty. Although she reflects on her experiences with Patrick Sonnier and other death
row inmates with the impassioned conviction and humble confidence of an activist, the
true struggle of her work emerges in her interaction with the families of those murdered,
and the only regret of her experiences, particularly in Sonnier’s case, remains her initial
failure to care for these families as she should have. Prejean did not interact with either
family until an irreparable impression of negligence had been made. After Sonnier’s
Pardon Board hearing, David LeBlanc’s father, Lloyd, introduced himself to Prejean for
the first time and said, “‘Sister, I’m a Catholic. How can you present Elmo Patrick
Sonnier’s side like this without ever having come to visit with me and my wife or the
Bourques to hear our side?”148 LeBlanc’s question brought Prejean down to the pain and
suffering of the situation in which she was engaged. She took the confrontation to heart,
and never again neglected the presence and concerns of victims’ families. “I see now that
I devoted my energies exclusively to Pat Sonnier’s plight when I should have shouldered
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the struggles of the victims’ families,” she acknowledges in Dead Man Walking. “I
should have reached out to the Bourques and LeBlancs immediately and offered them
love and comfort, even if they chose to reject it.”149 Prejean’s regret led to action on
behalf of victims and their families. In 1988, Prejean teamed with Janet Yassen, a
coordinator of the Victims Violence Program in Cambridge, Massachusetts, and Dianne
Kidner, a New Orleans Mennonite Volunteer, to create Survive, a New Orleans-based
victim assistance group still in existence today. 150 “All the sorrow and loss is
overwhelming, yet I don’t feel devastated,” Prejean reported in 1991 after attending a
women’s meeting of Survive and hearing mothers’ stories of murdered loved ones.
“There’s something in the women that strengthens me […] they have grace, tenacity, a
great capacity to absorb pain and loss and yet endure.”151 After overcoming her initial
lapse in attending to victims’ families, this became Prejean’s general sentiment: the
stories of murder victims are inevitably horrific tragedies, but hope and resolve outlast
hatred and vengeance in the hearts of those that survive their loved ones. Several years
after Patrick Sonnier’s execution, Lloyd LeBlanc corroborated this conclusion. Though
he continues to struggle with expected animosity toward Sonnier, LeBlanc eventually
recanted his wish for Sonnier’s execution and told Prejean he would have accepted life
imprisonment in lieu of the death penalty. LeBlanc’s example is the greatest testament to
forgiveness Prejean has encountered in decades of work with death row inmates and the
families of murder victims. Though she missed him at the start of her journey, LeBlanc
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confirmed for Prejean that tragedies of murder and death can find reconciliation in those
that remain.
This reconciliation, however, is never easy, and no one made this distinction
clearer to Prejean than Vernon Harvey, who Prejean met during her counsel of Robert
Lee Willie. Harvey, the stepfather of Faith Hathaway, Willie’s victim, anxiously
anticipated Willie’s execution, telling the press he couldn’t wait to see “‘smoke fly off
[Willie’s] body’” and find consolation for the loss of his stepdaughter in watching Willie
die.152 Harvey’s first words to Prejean upon their introduction in Baton Rouge, “‘Watch
out or someone is going to hurt you,’” set the tone for what would be a contentious
relationship that lasted long past Willie’s eventual execution. 153 Although Prejean and
Harvey entertained several friendly exchanges at the Harvey’s home and elsewhere both
throughout and following Willie’s death, their viewpoints never converged, as in the case
of Lloyd LeBlanc. An elated Harvey told reporters immediately following Willie’s
execution that Willie died too quickly and should have underwent the same torment and
anguish his stepdaughter did, and that he was so happy Willie died that he could dance.154
In frustration and relative helplessness, Prejean resolved to avoid Harvey and his wife,
Elizabeth, following Willie’s execution, but quickly found she could not avoid them. She
ran into the Harveys again and again – at death penalty rallies, executions, conferences,
seminars, a Parents of Murdered Children group session, even in the New Orleans
Veterans’ hospital following Harvey’s open-heart surgery. At these meetings, Harvey
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typically rattled off his favorite pro-death penalty arguments, many grounded in
retribution, and Prejean responded with her favorite counterarguments, often calling for
Harvey to reconsider the violent effect of state executions on society. Harvey never truly
found the satisfaction in Willie’s death he sought, frequently lamenting the speed and
painlessness of his execution. Their difference of opinion produced a strange friendship
and lively, albeit contentious, conversation. Harvey complicated Prejean’s belief in
reconciliation for all involved in capital matters. He demonstrated that while forgiveness
is always possible, it must be chosen, fought for, and worked toward. The families of
murder victims should be angry, and sometimes, they remain so, even when vengeance is
not enough.
On August 19, 1993, Antoinette “Toni” Bosco, a New York-based Catholic,
writer, columnist, and mother of six, received word that John, one of her sons, and his
wife, Nancy, had been murdered in their Montana home. As the investigation of their
deaths progressed and the police identified their murderer, Bosco underwent the expected
hardship of a mother of victims of a brutal homicide. “I had felt the anger that makes one
crazy enough to kill,” she retells in Choosing Mercy, her account of the incident and
aftermath, “and at times I believed that if ever the murderer was caught, I would not
know if I could want his life spared.”155 But when she first viewed the room in the
Montana home where her son and daughter-in-law had died, viewed the stain of blood on
the walls and floor, and touched the scattered bulletholes with her own hands, a powerful
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transformation occurred within her that reviled all forms of the “evil of unnatural
death.”156 She explains:
I knew that I could never accept unnatural death at the hands of another
again, not even when it is called legitimate, but more so, I knew why. Life
and death are God’s territory, not ours. I wanted the killer found, put
away, and punished. I knew I would have to struggle a long time with my
feelings, because the anger was still so fresh. But never would I be able to
say, ‘Kill the killer.’157
Bosco’s experience led not only to her rejection of unnatural death by way of murder, but
to her denial of the legitimacy of unnatural death as state-authored defense. She could not
accept the human regulation of life and death, shying away from the moral ground of
ultimate judgment. She refused to support murder as retributive punishment, answering
the anger and violence of her son’s death with forgiveness and a renewed pursuit of life,
and has since taken her cause on the road with Prejean and many others, calling for the
abolition of capital punishment in the United States.
Bosco’s translation of personal belief to action is a bold commitment not without
challenge and doubt. “I had to ask myself back then, and over and over since then,” she
acknowledges in Choosing Mercy, “do I have enough of God’s love in me to pray for this
young killer? Perhaps. Because I do pray for him, knowing in my soul that I must, for the
sake of my own redemption.”158 Bosco insists that she pray for the man who murdered
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her son, an exercise of humility that can only come through true forgiveness. Not only
does she strive to pray for him, but she equates herself with him, an innocent victim’s
mother paralleled with a heinous killer. She realizes that she is one with the murderer in
the solidarity of sin and the greater need for redemption. In solidarity with murderers,
therefore, Bosco passionately pleads for their lives. “Very often they (people in support
of capital punishment) point to people like me,” she notes. “They say the only way I can
have ‘justice’ is to see the murderer killed. But I ask, what good can come of heaping
more violence upon the violence already done? I beg, please don’t ask to kill in my
name.”159 Based on her own experience of having her son violently and unexpectedly
taken, Bosco pleads that violence not beget more violence, and shows that specious
definitions of justice often rely on the merit of violent punishment and vengeance. Her
experience demands that she, like Prejean, take her understanding of justice without
violence to a higher level of action and advocacy, a step beyond her identity as a murder
victim’s mother to solidarity with the murdered and their murderers.
The stories of those Prejean has met in courtrooms, on death row, in execution
chambers, and elsewhere within the American capital legal process – the stories of
Patrick Sonnier, Edwin Edwards, Lloyd LeBlanc, Vernon Harvey, and even Justice
Antonin Scalia – tell Prejean’s story. Given the enormity of her work, the characters and
people involved in her experience demonstrate concretely what she means when she
states that she “lives on the ground.” These stories and their characters, therefore, bring
out one of the central messages in her work, a message as or more important than her
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general call to end the death penalty in America: get involved, meet the people the law
serves and regulates, and ultimately, join her on the ground.
At the conclusion of her discussion of Scalia in Death of Innocents, Prejean tells the story
of one, final individual. His name is David Bates, and during a question-and-answer
portion of remarks Antonin Scalia gave at the University of Chicago regarding the death
penalty, he stood up and told about his experience with the American legal system. “‘I’m
a formerly incarcerated individual, served ten years in prison, was falsely accused of a
crime, tortured, beaten,’” he explained. “‘You have innocent people on death row right
now, who have been forced to sign confessions, who have been tortured, suffocated,
beaten […] I’m scared. I’m worried.’”160 Reflecting on Bates’ bravery, Prejean writes:
At that polite, intellectual conference he stood up, the only speaker that
day who knew personally that the broken, flawed criminal justice system
does to people. Bates spoke with an authority that cut through the jocular
atmosphere, confronting everyone with hard realities, because he’s been
there, he’s lived on the ground.161
Prejean’s work paints a rather gruesome picture of the criminal justice system, a portrayal
that emphasizes many elements that need reform, and very few aspects of the system
which function well, despite many aspects that do. Though Bates was the only speaker
that day who stood up and told his story, an unfortunate, awful story, the law serves the
public that were present at that conference and elsewhere, in a general sense, better than
Prejean admits. Her work can leave readers wondering if our nation’s legal system does
160
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anything right or just, or if it is simply a biased, discriminatory, and thoughtless system of
violence and vengeance. This is not Prejean’s intent, and fortunately so, because our legal
system does do justice, and it does seek what is right. Her lasting point, however, that our
nation needs individuals like Bates to stand, speak, and act to reform the legal system
where reformation is needed, could not be more true given the various testimonies of her
work. The American practice of capital punishment is one area in need of reformation
and reconsideration, whether or not Prejean’s call to abolish the death penalty completely
should be enacted. As societal standards of defense and justice evolve in the United
States, so also should the consciences of individuals in society, whether informed by
Catholic faith, some other form of Christianity, or otherwise. Her work invokes a duty on
all to seek out the best response to the most challenging evils of our time, with murder,
whether by the state or an individual, being perhaps the most apparent evil, and pursue
without end the best means of preserving and sustaining human life.
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CONCLUSION

It is tempting, given the span of Catholic viewpoints on capital punishment in the
United States that Antonin Scalia, John Suthers, and Helen Prejean provide, to wonder
who has it right, and who does not. Are Scalia and Suthers justified in their consistent
support for the death penalty, even in light of Church teaching that suggests otherwise? Is
Prejean more correct in her view that the death penalty should be abolished entirely, and
that all who murder, regardless of circumstance, should live nonetheless? Or is there
some middle ground or position that combines differing viewpoints in a way that best
follows Church teaching and applies the teaching in the most rational manner on behalf
of society?
At some level, it seems that each viewpoint is correct. Scalia and Suthers are
correct in that society must answer the wrong that murderers commit with a punishment
of commensurate weight. Punishment is a necessary component in maintaining social
order and enforcing a society’s social contract. But Prejean’s belief that punishment
should function to change the life of a murderer in a positive way, rather than
automatically end it, also has merit. She personally and intimately understands the
renewal to which murderers can aspire, and commendably fights for their lives. At the
same time, however, Scalia, Suthers, and Prejean all seem wrong in certain aspects.
Scalia and Suthers are misguided in their overall understanding of Church teaching on the
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death penalty. They are too unyielding in their conviction that heinous murderers deserve
the death penalty, and unwisely obstinate in their support of the state’s motivation to
enact retribution. The most tragic cases of heinous murder, however, repeatedly test
Prejean’s position that no murderer should die as punishment for killing, regardless of
how premeditated, widespread, and/or blatantly evil the action of murder. She also
promotes a general skepticism of the American system of criminal justice that threatens
the potential for mutually agreeable future action to limit or remove the state’s option to
exercise capital punishment.
But if Scalia, Suthers, and Prejean are all right, and if Scalia, Suthers, and Prejean
are all wrong, who wins in the end? What, ultimately, should be done?
When angry, troubled individuals end innocent lives, and a state of divinely-given
authority entrusted with the governance of a broken society must provide an answer for
killing, no one wins. The presence of Augustine’s City of Man162 in the United States is
an unfortunate, yet plainly apparent, reality. Sinful humans will never stop killing. They
will only find more efficient means of cruel and calculated murder, and tragically
enough, more victims. The state, then, has no future option but to continue to respond to
murder to the best extent possible, pushing onward in improving correctional systems and
developing corresponding means of defending society and preventing the action of
killing. This conflict will not cease. A change in mindset, therefore, must occur: a shift
away from adversarial, right-wrong, win-lose thinking among those like Scalia, Suthers,
162
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and Prejean to a new, cooperative agenda aimed at modeling the City of God with life as
society’s highest attainable prize.
Given the contemporary practice of capital punishment in the United States, the
Cities of God and Man may not be very far apart. Scalia, Suthers, Prejean, and those like
them already hold the prize of life in high esteem. But action can be taken to hold life in
the highest esteem – wider circulation and understanding the Catholic Church’s teaching
on the death penalty, increased societal commitment to restorative justice and the renewal
of murderers, and reform, improvement, and further development of society’s ability to
defend itself without recourse to the death penalty – and with this action, American
society can continue in its search for the answer of greatest justice for the greatest evils it
faces. It is, perhaps, inconclusive whether or not the United States needs the death
penalty, and inconclusive whether or not the Catholic Church explicitly condones or
condemns its use in every American context. But the tremendous value of human life,
and the enormous importance of the task of promoting human life, is anything but
inconclusive.
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AFTERWORD

When I started this project, I thought that just by reading, thinking, and writing, I
might answer Helen Prejean’s call and make a contribution to our nation’s discussion of
the death penalty and our discernment of its practice. The time for me to act and live in
this realm, I thought, remains in the future. The true opportunity to inform my conscience
through action will come, I decided, but for now, I am doing all I can. Some day, I will
defend capital offenders, or prosecute them on behalf of society, or assume divinelygiven authority and issue judgments that promote life, or witness an execution, but not
today. For the time being, my written work is enough.
But when I started to read and study Helen Prejean’s work and truly grasp the
intent of her message, I realized I could not just write and wait, even though I hope this
work achieves the force of effect with which it is given, and makes some impact in itself.
Presently, I cannot practice law or participate through the other roles I have listed here.
But as I came to the end of this project of research and discovery, I knew I had to do
something; not everything, not answer the greatest and hardest questions about the death
penalty, not save the world, but something. In January, at a radio interview in which I
discussed my work with Michael J. Sheridan, Bishop of Colorado Springs, he encouraged
me to pray for those on death row and our society as a whole as we wrestle with the
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difficult issues at play in our practice capital punishment. I prayed as he suggested, but
wanted to do more.
So, in January, I wrote to Matt Puckett for the first time. Matt is a death row
inmate at Mississippi State Penitentiary in Parchman, MS, the penitentiary at which
Donald Cabana was warden when two executions shook his soul irreparably. I found
Matt’s contact information online at a website that advertises death row inmates looking
for pen pals. (Many such websites are available, though Matt’s profile has since been
removed.) Given the multitude of inmates seeking correspondence by writing, I chose
Matt, oddly enough, because he reminded me of myself. His profile picture featured a
young man in a baseball hat at a restaurant or some other public locale, blond hair, blue
eyes, and Catholic. The profile expressed an interest in sports, featured an extensive
reading list, and briefly discussed his background in the military. “My life held great
potential for adventure and excitement,” he wrote in his profile. “I came from a loving
family and had many friends. Then things went horribly wrong.”
In February, Matt wrote back for the first time. His letter did not include details
regarding what and how things went horribly wrong. Frankly, I am not too concerned
with what Matt did. In time, he will tell me if he wishes, and I could probably find the
information on the Internet, but I do not plan to search. From what I have read, Matt was
born on January 3, 1977. He was sentenced to death on August 5, 1996, and began
serving his sentence on August 10, 1996. Another date looms on which his death
sentence will come to bear, unless circumstances provide otherwise, but for now, like me,
he spends his days reading, thinking, and writing.
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Then again, who am I kidding? Of course I am curious about what Matt did to end
up on death row, and I would be lying if I suggested otherwise. It has been hard to avoid
publicly available information about his crime. I have done my best to steer around it, but
where I have failed, I have only glimpsed the details of an awful murder. His story,
though I do not know it completely, is strikingly tragic in the way Pope John Paul II
discusses such incidents in Evangelium Vitae. I do not know all of the details, and I
intend to continue to navigate around them as possible, unless Matt writes me otherwise.
Regardless, I am frequently reminded that I write letters to a murderer, and the process
continually calls me to separate the human, baseball hat-wearing reader from the worst
action of his life, and, as Augustine first said, separate sin from sinner.
In his letter, Matt wrote about boredom, the greatest hardship he faces in prison.
He wrote about his goals and New Year’s resolutions, one of which is to write at least
one letter every day. Over the last three years, he’s written 1267 letters, one way to
combat the boredom of life imprisonment. He also tries to learn a new vocabulary word
every week, and is in the process of reading toward a “college-level science
education.”163 Matt also writes short stories and essays, and some of his work is available
online. Though Matt’s education ended with a high school diploma, his written work is
impressively creative and articulate. In “Too Close for Comfort,” an essay posted on
Prisoner Express: The bridge between prisoners and the outside world, Matt discusses
the process of “taking turns” in life. He begins the essay with one such turn:
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It’s your turn. Picture yourself on deck in a baseball game. The bat is in
your hands and you feel the weight and texture of it as you do warm-up
swings […] You step up to the plate with a tingling excitement coursing
through you. You stare down the pitcher, daring him to pitch anything
remotely to your liking […] The pitch comes and in a second your mind
calculates the speed and direction as your eyes never leave the ball […]
Your body torques, swinging the bat; it connects with the ball with a
resounding crack. The ball has left you quicker than it came to you and
sails out of the park. As you make the circuit of bases the excitement in
you can barely be contained. A huge smile crosses your face that you
aren't even aware of. The thrill is wonderful. 164
The thrill is so wonderful, Matt suggests, because the activity he describes – warming-up
on deck, stepping-up to the plate, hitting the ball, rounding the bases, smiling – is entirely
voluntarily, all a product of the wonderful thrill of choice. Activities are less wonderful in
life, Matt explains, when they come involuntarily, in instances in which turns are not
chosen or preferred. “It's just too close for comfort for me,” Matt concludes in the essay.
“I know how close my turn is and it even makes my heart race to write about a sequence
of events that I am, at present, safely removed from.”165 Six men have been executed
during Matt’s time in prison, and he fears each day that his name might come next in the
batting order.
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“I hope you don’t get offended,” Matt wrote in the beginning of his letter to me,
“but this question needs to be asked […] What I want to know is should I expect this
correspondence to be nothing more than a research jaunt, or will you look to write even
afterwards?”166 When you are finished writing, are you finished with the project, Matt
seemingly asked me, or has the process and research impacted you enough to commit to
action? Am I just writing this thesis for scholarship’s (or graduation’s) sake, I thought
immediately, or do I actually care about the people I have encountered along the way?
“Everybody has questions, totally normal, but it doesn’t feel all that great if people write
[to me] with only the intent to sieve information and not get to know the person – me,”
Matt explained. “You need both to get the full effect.”167 I do not intend to stop writing to
Matt anytime soon. He will get plenty of letters, as well as other reading material. I
intend to send him a copy of the final draft of this project, and after that, a copy of Dead
Man Walking to add to his reading list. In the years to come, I hope our relationship will
continue to develop, and that I gain a wider understanding of both his person and the
information he possesses through our letters.
Though my conscience regarding the practice of capital punishment in American
society remains labored and somewhat unresolved as this project ends, I am sure enough
that I will never be able to separate myself from the questions and individuals involved in
this effort, particularly Matt. In the future, when I continue to contemplate many of the
questions and issues I have raised in this effort, I am confident that I will remember the
words of Thomas Aquinas, Pope John Paul II, and John Suthers. More so, however, I am
166
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certain that I will think of Matt, and pray that if his turn in the order does indeed come, he
steps up to the plate with courage and belief in the eternal peace that awaits him. Until
then, I will continue to picture him in an imagined prison yard at the Mississippi State
Penitentiary, firmly gripping the handle of a baseball bat, gazing intently at an incoming
pitch, swinging, connecting, rounding the bases, smiling, and living each day with hope
not yet lost.
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